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 ABSTRACT 
 
The paper develops a model of repeated interaction between a buyer and a seller, 
which is then tested via laboratory experiments. The model allows for both formal and 
informal incentives in the contractual relationship between the parties. Formal incentives 
are explicit, performance-conditioned obligations enforced by third parties, such as a 
binding bonus paid for meeting an objectively measurable criterion. Informal incentives 
are non-binding promises to reward good performance. Although they are not enforced 
by external institutions, parties engaged in long-term interactions have incentives to 
“keep their words” about these promises and such payments can provide motivation for 
desirable performance. 
The current literature posits that these two types of incentives can function either 
as complements, so that joint use leads to better outcomes than either alone, or as 
substitutes, so that the availability of formal incentives may actually undermine the 
effectiveness of informal incentives. This study uses laboratory experiments to provide a 
rigorous test of hypotheses about the interaction of these incentives. The observed results 
suggest that the complementarity effect occurs in certain situations, but that the 
substitution effect does not occur as predicted, possibly because people do not punish 
transgressions in the manner that the theoretical model assumes. 
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Introduction 
In many agricultural sectors, producers and buyers (integrators) interact 
repeatedly over many seasons, and these relationships are increasingly framed by the use 
of production contracts rather than reliance on spot markets (MacDonald et al, 2004). In a 
repeated interaction, the parties can use both formal and informal incentives to motivate 
behavior, and understanding how these two types of incentives interact is critical to 
analyzing how the entire relationship works. 
This paper investigates how formal and informal incentives work in combination, 
using laboratory experiments to test predictions from a theoretical model. The current 
literature posits that these two types of incentives can function either as complements, so 
that joint use leads to better outcomes than either alone, or as substitutes, so that the 
availability of formal incentives may actually undermine the effectiveness of informal 
incentives. The observations suggest that the complementarity effect does occur in certain 
institutional environments, as predicted. However, the substitution effect is not apparent, 
even under conditions predicted to favor it. 
Formal incentives refer to explicit, performance-conditioned obligations that are 
enforced by third parties, such as written contract terms enforced by the legal system. 
Once a party commits to a formal incentive to induce desirable performance by another 
party, he or she has no discretion to change the terms of the obligation. In tobacco 
contracts, for example, the buyers often condition contract prices on narrowly defined 
quality grades (Dmitri, 2003). 
Informal incentives refer to discretionary powers of the parties to reward and 
punish each other for good or bad performance. The use of informal incentives may arise 
when formal terms are impractical, due to the costs of monitoring performance or the 
difficulty of specifying performance in objective terms that can be verified by an 
enforcement institution. Informal incentives range from rewarding satisfactory 
performance with repeat business (i.e. the repeat-purchase mechanism of Klein and 
Leffler, 1981) to providing “perks” to favored customers to end-of-year bonuses based on 
employee performance1
When an interaction is modeled as a single-shot game, neither player should (in 
theory) respond to informal incentives for performance. The player with the last move 
would be expected to maximize his payoff by his choice at that decision node, regardless 
of the prior choices of other players. The penultimate mover would anticipate this 
response and make his choice at that node in an attempt to maximize his payoff, and the 
game would “unravel” accordingly. Thus, promises to pay discretionary rewards for 
. 
                                                 
1 This example refers to bonuses that are at the employer’s discretion and may be adjusted or withheld 
without legal consequences. Bonuses based on quantified criteria and part of a legally enforceable 
agreement, such as commission-based compensation for sales personnel, would be classified as formal 
incentives. 
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desirable performance are non-credible in this setting, and only formal incentives can 
induce better performance. 
In contrast, informal incentives can have powerful effects in interactions modeled 
as infinitely or indefinitely repeated games, sometimes referred to as relational contracts. 
In such a setting, the players may exercise their discretionary powers to reward other 
players for desirable performance. Although not enforced by external institutions (e.g. the 
legal system), these informal incentives may be self-enforcing, so that each player finds it 
in his own interest to adhere to his non-binding promise (Tesler, 1980). In such an 
equilibrium, each player weighs the current costs of providing discretionary rewards 
(upholding the equilibrium strategy) against the future costs of punishment by other 
players as a response to a failure to provide the rewards. 
In many real-world interactions, both formal and informal incentives may come 
into play. The availability of formal enforcement may vary across markets due to the 
different characteristics of the goods or services involved and the different institutions 
available for measuring performance. Enforcement options may also vary across nations, 
as the quality of the legal system will affect the feasibility and cost of writing and 
enforcing binding contracts (Dixit, 2004). 
The variety of possible combinations raises the question of how formal and 
informal incentives interact (MacLeod, 2007), and the economics literature has begun to 
explore this area, using both theoretical models and empirical data. Baker, Gibbons, and 
Murphy (1994) show in a theoretical model that formal incentives can be complements to 
informal incentives, meaning that the use of formal incentives improves the outcomes 
possible in a relational contract setting. This effect occurs because formal incentives act 
to reduce both parties’ potential gains from deviating from the terms of the agreement. 
However, it also possible for the two types of incentives to act as substitutes, 
meaning that the availability of formal incentives eliminates desirable outcomes from the 
set of those that can be supported in equilibrium (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994; 
Schmidt and Schnitzer, 1995). This effect occurs when the possibility of using formal 
incentives improves the outcomes that can be attained without any use of informal 
incentives (including the repeat-purchase mechanism), thereby decreasing the 
punishments that one party can impose on the other for deviating from the relational 
contract. 
The concepts of complementarity and substitution discussed above are defined 
within a standard, neoclassical economics framework involving rational and self-
interested actors. However, the choices made by actual individuals may be influenced by 
a host of psychological biases, which are often classified under the umbrella of 
behavioral economics. The literature on motivational crowding-out relates to the topic of 
the interaction of formal and informal incentives (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Frey, 
1997). In crowding-out models, the actors exhibit social preferences for reciprocity and 
cooperation or other types of intrinsic motivations for desirable activity. This theory 
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postulates that the provision of extrinsic financial incentives for performance can reduce, 
or “crowd out,” such unselfish motivations by devaluing the social norms on which they 
depend. Of course, it is also possible for extrinsic incentives to amplify intrinsic 
motivations (i.e. “crowding in”), such as when taxpayers’ perception of tax laws as fair 
and respectful induce better compliance with those laws (Frey, 1997). 
Some experimental studies have found evidence of motivational crowding out 
(e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2002). However, these studies usually involve changes in 
cooperation in one-shot games, such as the gift-exchange scenario. In these settings, 
theoretical models predict that self-interested agents will not cooperate at all, so any 
observed cooperation likely stems from behavioral motivations such as social preferences 
for reciprocity. In a relational contract setting, by contrast, there are self-interested 
motivations for cooperation, due to the formal and informal incentives discussed earlier. 
In a relational contract setting, some experimental studies (e.g. Lazzarini, Miller, 
and Zenger, 2004) have found evidence to support the complementarity effect. To our 
knowledge, however, no other experiment has tested both the complementarity and 
substitution effects within a repeated contract setting. The above authors, for example, 
consider motivational crowding out, but their specification does not allow for incentive 
substitution based on selfish behavior. The present study uses an experimental design that 
allows for both complementarity and substitution effects arising from self-interested 
agents, in order to examine whether both effects occur in observed behavior. 
An important issue in considering the interaction of formal and informal 
incentives is the range of incentives available. Some of the current literature tends to 
focus on single-price contracts, in which the only informal incentive is continuation of 
the relationship (MacLeod, 2007) using the Klein and Leffler (1981) repeat-purchase 
mechanism. (E.g. Brown, Falk, and Fehr, 2004; Lazzarini, Miller, and Zenger, 2004) In 
these models, the principal must share the surplus with the agent, in the spirit of Shapiro 
and Stiglitz’s (1984) efficiency-wage model, in order for the informal incentive to carry 
any impact. Additionally, the principal’s only method for punishing poor performance 
with respect to a non-contractible variable is termination of the relationship. This design 
omits the possibility of discretionary price adjustments, such as a voluntary bonus 
payment to the seller for good performance or other types of informal incentives. 
Other analyses, however, have incorporated the possibility of discretionary 
payments by the principal to reward the agent’s good performance. (E.g. Bull, 1987; 
Levin, 2003; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 2004; Wu and Roe, 2007a) In these models, 
the reward of continuing the relationship into the future is supplemented by additional 
payment in the current period, thereby strengthening the power of informal incentives 
and reducing the need for the principal to share surplus. The experimental design of the 
present study allows for a broad range of informal incentives, including a discretionary 
bonus payment in addition to the repeat-purchase mechanism. 
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Related to the question of complementarity or substitution, the issue of contract 
choice plays an important role in the interaction of formal and informal incentives. 
Bernheim and Whinston (1998) investigate the question of why many observed contracts 
are less complete than necessary. That is, why do parties often fail to include formal 
incentives that would be relatively easy to specify and enforce? If all performance 
variables are verifiable, then the parties could specify a complete contract, one that 
specifies formally enforceable contingent obligations for all possible states, and achieve a 
first-best outcome. However, if some performance variables cannot be verified, then 
some incompleteness in the contract is unavoidable. Using a theoretical model, those 
authors show that it may then be desirable for the parties to allow additional 
incompleteness, in the form of making otherwise enforceable terms discretionary. The 
resulting contracts exhibit such “strategic ambiguity,” not because the prospective 
performance measure is hard to specify, but because an explicit, enforceable obligation 
would lead to greater inefficiency. 
For example, consider a principal contracting with an agent to provide some 
service, with the expectation that the relationship will continue for a long time (e.g. an 
employment contract). If external enforcement institutions can verify only whether or not 
the agent performed some service, but not the agent’s level of effort or quality, then 
making the principal’s payment obligation enforceable will lead to an undesirable 
outcome. The agent will provide only a minimal level of effort, the principal will 
anticipate this, and the resulting contract will provide only minimal payment. If the 
principal’s payment obligation is left unspecified, then the threat of punishment can 
induce the agent to provide higher levels of effort, which the principal will reward with 
higher payment (in a repeated interaction). Thus, the parties may find it in their collective 
interest to form a contract that is more incomplete than is strictly necessary. Making the 
contract as complete as possible may reduce the achievable joint surplus, so they choose 
to leave “extra” discretion in the relationship. 
Using laboratory experiments involving repeated exchange, Wu and Roe (2007b) 
find evidence consistent with the conclusions of the strategic ambiguity model. Subjects 
in treatments that limited the discretion of the principal (i.e. required more contractual 
completeness) in adjusting current rewards for the agent’s performance achieved worse 
outcomes than did those with a broader range of discretion for the principal. This 
supports the idea that “additional” incompleteness may improve the welfare of the 
contracting parties. However, in their experiment, the choice of contractual structure was 
exogenously imposed, leaving open the question of whether the parties would voluntarily 
choose the more discretionary form of contract. The experiment conducted for the present 
paper allowed the parties to choose whether to incorporate an additional formal incentive, 
thus making the structure of the contract endogenous. 
In the next section, we develop a theoretical model that allows for both the 
complementarity and substitution effects by self-interested agents. The following section 
then describes the design of and results from an experimental test of these effects. 
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Notably, the design allows for separate tests of these effects, by creating treatments that 
favor each of them rather than presenting them as alternatives in a single institutional 
environment. The results show that the complementarity effect holds in the environment 
favorable to it. However, the substitution effect does not seem to be present when it is 
favored. Finally, we consider possible behavioral effects that might lead the subjects’ 
choices to deviate from those predicted by the model, paying particular attention to 
mechanisms for punishing out-of-equilibrium behavior. 
 
Theoretical Model 
In this section, we develop a principal-agent model to provide a theoretical basis 
for discussing the effects of and interactions between formal and informal performance 
incentives. A key element of this model is the subjects’ endogenous choice of the 
contract structure. That is, the principal has flexibility in determining whether to use only 
informal incentives in the contract or to include formal incentives in the offer. This 
choice allows for the possibility that rational players would choose not to use the formal 
terms. If the principal chooses to omit the formal incentive, creating a contract that is 
more incomplete than necessary, his behavior would be consistent with Bernheim and 
Whinston’s strategic ambiguity. 
Consider a buyer and seller, both risk-neutral, negotiating the exchange of a single 
unit of a good, which has two-dimensional quality that varies continuously on each 
dimension. That is, quality is expressed as Q = (q1, q2), and [ ]maxmin21 ,, qqqq ∈ . The first 
dimension of quality, q1, is verifiable; formally enforceable contract terms may be 
conditioned on q1. In contrast, q2 is merely observable by the parties but cannot be used 
as the basis for formally enforceable contract terms. 
The seller’s cost to produce one unit of the good is C(q1, q2), with C(Qmin) = Cmin 
≥ 0, where Qmin = (qmin, qmin). We assume that production cost is strictly increasing in 
both arguments: Ci > 0 and Cii ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2. If the seller does not produce the good, 
she receives a reservation payoff of μ. 
The buyer’s value for a unit of the good is V(q1, q2), with V(Qmin) = Vmin ≥ 0. We 
assume that value is likewise increasing in both arguments: Vi > 0 and Vii ≤ 0, for i = 1, 2. 
The buyer’s reservation payoff is normalized to 0. 
The buyer and seller make choices in the following sequence of events: 
1. Buyer offers a contract (several types possible, see below) 
2. Seller accepts or rejects offer. If he accepts, the seller chooses quality. 
3. Buyer observes quality and chooses discretionary bonus 
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The buyer proposes a contract in which he requests quality QR = (q1R, q2R), which 
is a non-binding term. That is, the seller can choose to deliver a quality level Q that 
differs from QR. In exchange for the good, the buyer offers some combination of the 
following payment terms: a fixed price, a formal bonus, and a discretionary bonus. The 
fixed price, p, is binding, meaning that it is paid if the contract is accepted, regardless of 
the quality provided by the seller. A formal bonus2
The range of contractual structures and the payoffs of both parties are summarized 
in the following table: 
, f, is binding and conditioned on the 
seller delivering quality such that q1 ≥ q1R. Thus, the formal bonus allows the verifiable 
nature of q1 to be used to describe a payment schedule that ties the seller’s compensation 
to performance. Since q2 is not verifiable by third-party enforcement mechanisms, no 
binding bonus can be conditioned on that aspect of quality. Including a binding bonus 
term (i.e. f > 0) imposes a transaction cost of x. The discretionary bonus is non-binding. 
The buyer may state a proposed discretionary bonus, dR, in the offer, but he chooses the 
bonus actually paid, d, after observing the seller’s choice of quality. 
 
 
 
Contract Terms Buyer’s Payoff Seller’s Payoff 
Unconditional (p, d) V(Q) – p – d p + d – C(Q) 
Conditional (p, f, d) V(Q) – p – f – d – x, if q1 ≥ q1R 
V(Q) – p – d – x, if q1 < q1R 
p + f + d – C(Q) , if q1 ≥ q1R 
p – d – C(Q) , if q1 < q1R 
No exchange  0 μ 
 
Table 1: Possible Payoffs 
 
 
 
Note that these amounts are the actual payoffs received by the parties. Since p and 
f are binding, the promised values and the amounts actually paid will be the same for 
these variables, although f is conditional on the seller providing at least the promised q1. 
In contrast, the quality actually provided and the discretionary bonus actually paid can 
differ from the promised amounts, Q ≠ QR and d ≠ dR. However, in the repeated game 
theoretical equilibrium, the actual values will equal the promised values. 
                                                 
2 A binding deduct term could be used, but is theoretically equivalent to a bonus. To keep the analysis 
simpler, we ignore the possibility of a binding deduct term (and a discretionary deduct by the buyer), since 
it does not add any insights in the theoretical model. 
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First-Best Outcome 
We define efficient quality as Q* = (q1*, q2*) ≡ argmax V(Q) – C(Q). Thus, Q* is 
the quality that would maximize the joint surplus available to the buyer and seller. We 
restrict attention to cases in which exchange is desirable by assuming that V(Q*) – C(Q*) 
> μ. For internal solutions, the first-order conditions are Vi(Q) = Ci(Q) for i = 1, 2. For a 
corner solution, efficiency dictates that qi be increased so long as Vi(Q) ≥ Ci(Q). The 
efficient quality, Q*, and its associated joint surplus provides a benchmark for analyzing 
the choices made by buyers and sellers acting to maximize their own payoffs, both in the 
theoretical model and in the laboratory experiment. 
The first-best outcome is for the seller to provide Q* in response to the buyer 
offering the costless contract, (p, d). This assumes that x > 0; if x = 0, the choice of 
contract form is irrelevant for efficiency. 
 
Stage Game 
The stage game models the participants’ behavior in a one-time interaction, with 
each player acting to maximize his or her own payoff for that round. The familiar 
principle of backward induction can be applied to find the equilibrium outcome of the 
stage game. 
In step 3, the buyer will maximize his payoff by reneging on any promised 
discretionary bonus; thus, he will choose d = 0 regardless of the quality chosen by the 
seller. 
In step 2, a seller who has accepted a contract will maximize her payoff while 
realizing that the buyer will choose d = 0. Since there is no credible reward for delivering 
a high q2, she will always choose q2 = qmin. Her choice for q1 depends on how the amount 
of the formal bonus relates to the cost of delivering the requested q1R. She will choose q1 
= q1R if and only if f ≥ C(q1R, qmin) – C(qmin, qmin), and she will choose q1 = qmin 
otherwise. 
The seller will accept the contract only when her payoff under the contract, given 
her expected choice for q1, exceeds her reservation payoff. Thus, she will accept if and 
only if p – Cmin + max{0, f – C(q1R, qmin) + Cmin} ≥ μ. 
In step 1, the buyer chooses whether to offer a contract and the terms of the 
contract, with knowledge of the choice rules that will govern the subsequent steps. For 
simplicity, assume that the buyer will not offer a contract that he expects the seller to 
reject. Making such an offer is equivalent to the buyer choosing no exchange from the 
outset. 
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The buyer will use the formal bonus only if it is incentive-compatible. That is, the 
buyer will not offer f > 0 unless he expects the seller to comply by choosing q1 ≥ q1R, 
because doing otherwise would incur the transaction cost x without affecting the seller’s 
choice of quality. This incentive-compatibility condition requires that f ≥ C(q1R, qmin) – 
Cmin whenever f > 0. 
If the buyer decides to offer a contract, he chooses the terms (QR, p, f) in order to 
maximize V(q1R, qmin) – p – f – I(f)x, where I(f) is an indicator function with I = 1 for f > 0 
and I = 0 for f = 0. Thus, there are three possible equilibrium outcomes for the stage 
game. 
First, the buyer could offer a conditional contract requesting q1R = q1** (defined 
below) and offering to pay p = Cmin + μ and f = C(q1**, qmin) – Cmin > 0. The seller 
accepts and provides Q = (q1**, qmin). The buyer earns a payoff of V(q1**, qmin) – C(q1**, 
qmin) – x – μ, and the seller earns a payoff of μ. Define q1** ≡ argmax V(q1, qmin) – C(q1, 
qmin), which is the buyer’s optimal q1, given that the seller will supply q2 = qmin. If the 
cross-partial derivates are zero, so that V12 = V21 = 0 and C12 = C21 = 0, then the buyer 
will request the first-best level for q1, so q1** = q1*. 
Second, the buyer could offer an unconditional contract requesting q1R = qmin and 
offering to pay p = Cmin + μ and f = 0. The seller accepts and provides Q = Qmin. The 
buyer earns a payoff of V(Qmin) – Cmin – μ, and the seller earns a payoff of μ. 
The third possibility is that the buyer does not offer a contract, so no exchange is 
the outcome. The buyer earns his reservation payoff of 0 and the seller earns her 
reservation payoff of μ. 
The equilibrium of the stage game depends on which of these three options yields 
the highest payoff for the buyer. If V(q1**, qmin) – C(q1**, qmin) – x – μ is the greatest of 
the three possible payoffs, then the conditional contract resulting in Q = (q1**, qmin) is the 
stage-game equilibrium. Similarly, if V(qmin, qmin) – Cmin – μ is the highest, then an 
unconditional contract inducing Q = (qmin, qmin) is the equilibrium. If both of those 
payoffs are negative, then no exchange is the stage-game equilibrium. In the repeated-
game model, the stage-game equilibrium is relevant mostly in determining what 
threatened punishments are credible for determining the incentive-compatibility 
constraints. 
In terms of the seller’s incentive compatibility in the repeated game, the possible 
stage-game outcomes are equivalent. Since the profit-maximizing buyer chooses the 
terms of the offer, in a stage-game setting he will always make the seller’s participation 
constraint bind, so that p + f – C(Q) = μ. Thus, the seller can expect a payoff of μ in every 
future period if he deviates from a relational contract equilibrium. 
In terms of the buyer’s incentive compatibility (when a discretionary bonus is 
used), the choice among credible threats is more important. In the stage game, the buyer 
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captures all of the surplus from exchange, net of paying the seller’s reservation utility. 
Thus, a comparison of the net surplus under each option determines which of the three 
threats is credible and what future payoff the buyer can expect if he deviates from a 
relational contract equilibrium. Thus, define Πstage = max{V(q1**, qmin) – C(q1**, qmin) – 
x – μ, V(qmin, qmin) – Cmin – μ, 0} to be the buyer’s payoff in the stage game, reflecting 
which of the three possible outcomes will occur in equilibrium. 
 
Repeated Interaction 
When parties interact over long timeframes, their behavior in a given period is 
influenced not only by the current payoffs but also by the possibility of rewards or 
punishments in future periods. Relational contracting can be modeled as an infinitely 
repeated game3
∑
t
it
t Pδ
, in which the stage game represents one period and payoffs in future 
periods are discounted at a rate δ. In such a model, each person i seeks to maximize 
 for t = 0, 1, 2,…, ∞, where Pit is person i’s payoff in period t. 
This type of game can be interpreted either as an infinitely repeated game with δ 
representing the person’s rate of time preference or as a game of finite but uncertain 
duration, in which δ relates to the probability of playing period t. For this latter 
interpretation, consider a game in which at the end of each period there is probability of 
(1– δ) that the game terminates. Risk-neutral players would seek to maximize the sum of 
expected payoffs, which creates a structure equivalent to an infinitely repeated game with 
time discounting. 
In this game, contracts are incomplete due to the unenforceability of contract 
terms based on q2. However, both parties can observe the actions taken by the other and 
there is no asymmetric information. Following Levin (2003), optimal relational contracts 
in such a situation can be framed in stationary forms. In this analysis, a relational contract 
is an equilibrium outcome (p, d, f, Q) and associated strategies that are constant across 
periods. 
A standard assumption is that the parties use trigger strategies4
                                                 
3 In laboratory experiments, results consistent with infinite repetition models have also been found with 
contracting games of finite, known duration. See Wu and Roe (2007b) for an example in the context of 
buyer-seller contracts. Kreps et al (1982) present a theoretical model explaining this phenomenon by the 
presence of “cooperative” types composing some fraction of the subject population, thereby supporting 
cooperative behavior even for selfish players in a finitely repeated game. 
 to ensure each 
others’ compliance. Under such a strategy, each party will punish the other’s deviation 
from the desirable equilibrium behavior by taking the action that most heavily penalizes 
the offender within the constraint that the action must be rational for the punisher. In this 
4 This approach abstracts from the issue of renegotiation of the agreement, which is assumed to be 
impossible. 
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game, the harshest credible punishment is to revert to the stage-game equilibrium for all 
periods once the other party has deviated. Thus, deviation from the relational contract 
leads to the buyer receiving a payoff of Πstage and the seller receiving a payoff of μ, in all 
future periods. 
 
Unconditional Contracts 
If the buyer forgoes the use of the formal bonus, f, then he loses one possible 
channel for providing performance incentives, but he may also avoid costs associated 
with creating and enforcing a legal instrument. An agreement without a formal bonus is 
labeled an unconditional contract, because the payments are not conditioned on the 
seller’s performance in an explicit, enforceable manner. 
In this model, the buyer chooses the terms in the offered contract. However, there 
are four constraints on this choice: the buyer’s and seller’s participation (individual 
rationality) constraints and the buyer’s and seller’s incentive-compatibility constraints. In 
equilibrium, the principal (the buyer, in this model) maximizes his payoff by choosing 
the terms of the relational contract while abiding by those four constraints. 
The contract must satisfy the seller’s participation constraint, meaning that the 
seller prefers exchange under the contract to rejecting the contract and receiving the 
reservation payoff, μ. 
 p + d ≥ C(Q) + μ (U1) 
 
The left-hand side of (U1) represents the benefits the seller gains in each period 
from exchange under the equilibrium contract, while the right-hand side represents her 
costs for the exchange, including forgoing her reservation payoff, μ. (See Appendix C for 
a more complete derivation of (U1) and other results in the theoretical model.) 
The contract must also satisfy the seller’s incentive-compatibility constraint, 
meaning that the seller prefers to deliver the requested quality and continue to operate 
under the terms of the contract into the future than to deliver low quality this period and 
be punished by operating under the stage game in future periods. 
 ( ) µ
δ
δ
δδ
+
−
−≥+ min
1 CQCdp  (U2) 
 
When (U2) holds, the seller prefers to act in accordance with the relational 
contract, receiving p + d in payment while incurring C(Q) in costs, rather than deviate by 
providing low quality. By deviating, the seller could reduce her current cost to Cmin and 
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still receive the fixed price p in the current period, but would forgo the discretionary 
bonus d and be limited to a payoff of μ in all future periods. Note that the seller’s payoff 
under the stage game, which is the deviation payoff, is equal to μ regardless of which 
stage-game outcome constitutes the equilibrium. 
The contract must satisfy the buyer’s participation constraint, meaning that the 
buyer prefers exchange under the contract to not offering a contract and receiving the 
reservation payoff of 0. 
 p + d ≤ V(Q) (U3) 
 
The left-hand side of (U3) represents the buyer’s cost in each period under the 
relational contract, while the right-hand side represents his benefit. Note that his 
reservation payoff is 0, which would otherwise be included on the left-hand side. 
Finally, the contract must satisfy the buyer’s incentive-compatibility constraint, 
meaning that the buyer prefers to pay the promised discretionary bonus and continue to 
operate under the terms of the contract into the future than to renege on that bonus in the 
current period and be punished by operating under the stage game in future periods. 
 ( ) stageΠ−≤+ QV
dp
δ
 (U4) 
 
If the buyer reneges, he can avoid the payment of the discretionary bonus d in the 
current period while still paying the fixed price p and receiving V(Q). However, the seller 
would punish this deviation by reverting to the stage-game equilibrium outcome for all 
future periods. 
In combination, these conditions determine whether an unconditional contract is 
feasible for a given Q, meaning that an outcome (p, d, Q) exists that can be supported by 
a relational contract and that both parties find (weakly) preferable to no exchange. The 
combined feasibility condition can be expressed as: 
 ( ) ( ) µ
δ
δ
δ
+
−
−Π≥− minstage
1 CQCQV  (U5) 
 
When (U5) holds for some range of Q, then the buyer can choose the contract 
terms to maximize his payoff under the constraints (U1)-(U4). He will choose the 
payment terms pU and dU such that dU ≥ dmin = C(QU) – Cmin and pU + dU = C(QU) + μ. 
Note that the buyer’s payoff is V(QU) – pU – dU = V(QU) – C(QU) – μ, so the buyer 
captures all of the net surplus. He will therefore choose QU = Q* if Q* is feasible as 
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expressed in (U5). Otherwise, the buyer will choose the QU that maximizes the net 
surplus subject to the feasibility constraint. 
 
Conditional Contracts 
If the buyer uses the formal bonus, f, then he has one additional method for 
providing an incentive for high quality, but he may also incur additional costs for using 
such an instrument. An agreement including a formal bonus is labeled a conditional 
contract, because the payments are enforceable and explicitly conditioned on the seller’s 
performance. As before, the buyer will choose the terms of the offered contract in order 
to maximize his payoff, subject to the four types of constraint: the two participation 
constraints and the two incentive-compatibility constraints. 
The seller’s participation constraint requires that the seller prefer exchange under 
the contract to receiving her reservation payoff, μ. With the conditional contract, this 
constraint can be expressed as: 
 p + f + d ≥ C(Q) + μ (C1) 
 
The interpretation of (C1) and the other constraints are similar to those for the 
unconditional contract described previously. The difference is the effect of the formal 
bonus payment, f. 
When the seller’s incentive-compatibility constraint is met, the seller prefers to 
deliver the requested quality and continue under the contract than to deliver low quality 
this period, thereby lowering her costs, and be punished by operating under the stage 
game in future periods. 
 ( ) ( ) µ
δ
δ
δδ
+
−
−≥++ min1 ,
1 qqCQCdfp  (C2) 
 
Under the conditional contract, the seller’s best deviation is to provide quality of 
(q1, qmin), in order to receive the formal bonus payment in the current period. Thus, (C2) 
includes C(q1, qmin) on the right-hand side, rather than Cmin as found in (U2). As under the 
unconditional contract, the seller’s deviation payoff is μ, regardless of which stage-game 
outcome constitutes the equilibrium. 
The buyer’s participation constraint for the conditional contract is: 
 p + f + d ≤ V(Q) – x (C3) 
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The difference between (C3) and (U3) is the inclusion of the formal bonus, f, and 
the contracting cost, x, both of which reduce the buyer’s net payoff. 
Finally, the contract must satisfy the buyer’s incentive-compatibility constraint, 
which reflects his decision to pay the promised discretionary bonus rather than to renege 
on that bonus in the current period and be punished by reversion to the stage game in 
future periods. 
 ( ) xQVdfp −Π−≤++ stageδ
 (C4) 
 
If the buyer reneges, he avoids the payment of the discretionary bonus d in the 
current period while still paying the fixed price p and the formal bonus f and receiving 
V(Q) in return. He also incurs the contracting cost x in the current period. However, the 
seller would punish this deviation by reverting to the stage-game equilibrium outcome for 
all future periods. 
In combination, these conditions determine whether a conditional contract is 
feasible for a given Q, meaning that an outcome (p, f, d, Q) exists that can be supported 
by a relational contract and that both parties find (weakly) preferable to no exchange. The 
combined feasibility condition can be expressed as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) xqqCQCQV ++−−Π≥− µ
δ
δ
δ min1stage
,1  (C5) 
 
When (C5) holds for some range of Q, then the buyer can choose the contract 
terms to maximize his payoff under the constraints (C1)-(C4). He will choose the 
payment terms pC and dC such that dC ≥ dmin = C(QC) – C(q1, qmin) and pC + f C + dC = 
C(QC) + μ. 
Note that the buyer’s payoff is V(QC) – pC – f C – dC – x = V(QC) – C(QC) –μ – x. 
Thus, the buyer captures all of the net surplus and will choose QC = Q* if Q* is feasible. 
Otherwise, the buyer will choose the QC to maximize the net surplus subject to the 
feasibility constraint. 
Choice of Contract 
The theoretical model presents some interesting results regarding the buyer’s 
choice of contract structure (conditional or unconditional) in the repeated game. When at 
least one of the two feasibility conditions is met for some Q (implying that outcome is 
preferable to no exchange), then the buyer will choose the contract that offers him the 
higher payoff. Thus, he will choose to offer an unconditional contract if V(QU) – C(QU) –
μ > V(QC) – C(QC) – μ – x, and he will choose a conditional contract otherwise. In 
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general, QU ≠ QC, because the two types of contracts have different feasibility conditions. 
QU = QC when the efficient quality Q* is feasible under both types of contracts or when 
the upper limits of the feasible ranges just happen to coincide. 
For some sufficiently low x, (C5) will be less constraining than (U5), meaning 
that the set of Q feasible under an unconditional contract would be a subset of the set 
feasible for a conditional contract. This result holds because C(q1, qmin) > Cmin for q1 > 
qmin, so that the right-hand side of (C5) is less than the right-hand side of (U5), for a low 
x. In particular, use of the conditional contract would allow for higher quality levels. As 
long as the additional net surplus from higher quality is greater than the transaction cost, 
then the buyer would prefer the conditional contract to the unconditional contract, and the 
efficiency of the outcome would also be greater. 
In other cases, however, the buyer will prefer the unconditional contract. This 
would occur when x is high enough to offset the potential improvement in quality that a 
conditional contract would allow. In the extreme, if the optimal quality Q* is feasible 
under both contracts, then any x > 0 would induce the buyer to choose an unconditional 
contract, because extending the range of feasible Q has no benefit. In general, the model 
predicts that the buyer will choose an unconditional contract when x is high and a 
conditional contract when x is low. 
 
Quality 
The feasibility of a given quality level under the two contract types depends on 
the expected duration of partnerships, δ. This relationship can be seen more clearly when 
the two feasibility conditions are rewritten as follows: 
 ( ) ( )[ ] µ
δ
++−+Π≥ minminstage
1 CCQCQV  (U5’) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) xqqCqqCQCQV +++−+Π≥ µ
δ min1min1stage
,,1  (C5’) 
 
Given the initial assumption that Ci(Q) > 0 for i = 1, 2, the term in square brackets 
must be non-negative in both (U5’) and (C5’). Thus, increasing δ makes each type of 
contract “more feasible,” so that the feasibility conditions hold for larger ranges of Q. 
Thus, when the parties expect that interaction will continue for a long time, they are able 
to achieve higher-quality outcomes than when they expect relationships to be brief. 
The quality of the good also depends on the transaction cost, x. As noted above, 
lower values of x will increase the quality feasible under a conditional contract relative to 
that feasible under the unconditional contract. All else equal, this would suggest that a 
lower x improve the quality level that can be achieved. However, the level of x has 
another effect on the feasible quality through its impact on the stage game outcome. 
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The transaction cost affects the desirability of a conditional contract in stage 
game. At high levels of x, the conditional contract will be unattractive to the buyer, who 
would either offer the unconditional contract for minimum quality, Qmin, or choose no 
exchange. At some threshold level of x, the conditional contract for q1 > qmin becomes the 
stage game outcome. For x below this threshold level, the feasible quality increases and 
the stage-game payoff for the buyer improves. By increasing the stage-game payoff, 
Πstage, the lower value of x tends to reduce the level of quality feasible in the repeated 
game under both types of contracts. 
Which of the effects of x on feasible quality dominates will depend on the 
functional forms of V(Q) and C(Q) and the other parameters. However, it is possible that 
a decrease in transaction cost, thereby making formal incentives easier to use, can lead to 
a decline in the quality and net surplus that the parties can achieve. This results contrasts 
to most intuitions about making formal incentives more available. 
 
Experiment Design 
We designed and carried out a laboratory experiment to test the predictions of the 
theoretical model outlined in the previous section. During August and September of 
2008, we ran 19 experimental sessions: 5 each of the S, SX, and LX treatments and 4 of 
the L treatment. (The treatments are described below.) The subjects were undergraduate 
students of a variety of majors recruited via email from a major university. The 
experiments were conducted in a computer lab, using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 
2007). Each session involved from 6 to 12 subjects, with a total of 162 subjects over the 
19 sessions. 
The subjects were randomly assigned into pairs, with one buyer and one seller in 
each pair. Each pair played a repeated game of indefinite duration, creating an 
environment conducive to relational contracting. 
Because the experiment incorporated the indefinite repetition element of the 
model, the sessions’ durations varied. The average length of a session was 18.3 periods, 
with a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 37 (see Table 2). Although the experiment was 
designed so that the expected duration was roughly equal across treatments5
                                                 
5 Although the expected duration of partnerships, captured by the parameter δ, was intended to vary across 
treatments, the expected number of partnerships varied inversely to the expected duration. Thus, the S and 
SX sessions were intended to have more but shorter partnerships than were the L and LX sessions, but the 
total lengths of the various sessions were intended to be relatively similar, approximately 15 periods. 
, the realized 
durations varied considerably, with the S and SX treatments generally having shorter 
overall durations than did the L and LX treatments. In recognition of the potential 
differences across treatments due to learning effects, we perform some tests for learning 
effects and also control for them in econometric analyses. 
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  Number of Subjects Duration (Periods) Number of Partners 
Treatment Sessions Avg. Min. Max. Avg. Min. Max. Avg. Min. Max. 
S 5 8.8 6 10 15.2 11 19 4.2 2 7 
SX 5 8.4 6 10 14.4 11 17 4.0 2 6 
L 4 8.0 6 10 17.75 8 23 2.0 1 3 
LX 5 8.4 6 12 25.8 14 37 2.0 1 3 
Overall 19 8.5 6 12 18.3 8 37 3.1 1 7 
 
Table 2: Experimental Sessions 
 
 
 
The game played by the subjects implements a particular specification of the 
theoretical model described in the previous chapter. The instructions (see Appendix B for 
a sample) were read aloud and each subject was given a printed copy for reference during 
the session. In addition, each subject answered several multiple-choice questions about 
hypothetical situations in the game, with the correct answers provided afterwards, in 
order to help them understand the structure of the game. Finally, the subjects played 3 
practice rounds, identical to the normal rounds except that they had no effect on the 
subjects’ earnings. 
In each period, each buyer negotiates the exchange of a good with his seller 
partner. The good has a two-dimensional nature or quality, Q = (q1, q2). Each dimension 
of quality can take on any integer value from 1 to 10, so { }10,...,2,1, 21 ∈qq . The value of 
the good to the buyer (V) and its production cost to the seller (C) vary with its quality, 
and the functional forms are V(Q) = v1q1 + v2q2 and C(Q) = c1q1 + c2q2 , with parameters 
v1 = v2 = 10, c1 = 5, and c2 = 8. 
The first dimension of quality, q1, is verifiable by third parties (e.g. courts). Thus, 
formally enforceable contract terms can be made contingent on q1. On the other hand, q2 
is observable by the parties but not verifiable by third parties. Thus, incentives contingent 
on q2 cannot be formally enforced. In the repeated game, however, the buyer can use 
informal incentives to encourage high q2. 
The sequence of decisions in each round is as follows: 
Step 1: Buyer‘s Offer 
In the negotiations for each period, the buyer makes an offer or chooses to exit. In 
the latter case, no exchange takes place and the buyer and seller each receive his or her 
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reservation payoff (0 points for the buyer and 20 points for the seller). An offer consists 
of four terms: a quality request, a base price, a formal bonus, and an informal bonus. 
With the quality request, the buyer specifies the two quality levels (q1R, q2R) that 
he would like to receive from the seller. This request is not enforced, so the seller can 
choose any quality he or she wishes (in step 2), assuming the offer is accepted. 
The base price (p) is an unconditional payment made by the buyer to the seller. 
This price is enforced for any offer that is accepted, so the buyer pays this amount 
regardless of the quality that the seller delivers. 
The buyer also specifies a formal bonus (f), which will be paid if the seller 
delivers q1 (the verifiable dimension of quality) at least equal to the q1R requested.6
Finally, the buyer specifies a discretionary bonus (dR) that he promises to pay if 
the seller delivers the requested quality (both q1 and q2) or better. This term is not 
enforced, so the buyer can choose any amount (including d = 0) for the actual 
discretionary bonus, regardless of the quality delivered by the seller. Specifying a 
discretionary bonus does not incur a transaction cost. 
 This 
formal bonus will be enforced if the seller’s delivered quality meets the condition. The 
inclusion of this term (i.e. specifying a formal bonus greater than 0) triggers a transaction 
cost (x = 0 or 35, depending on the treatment) that the buyer must pay if the offer is 
accepted. 
The allowed ranges for the terms of the offer are 1 ≤ q1 ≤ 10, 1 ≤ q2 ≤ 10, 0 ≤ p ≤ 
200, 0 ≤ f ≤ 200, and 0 ≤ dR ≤ 200. Note that 200 is the benefit to the buyer of the 
maximum quality. 
Step 2: Seller’s Choice 
Once the buyer makes an offer, the seller chooses whether to accept or reject it. If 
the seller rejects, then no exchange takes place and each party receives his or her 
reservation payoff for the period. If the seller accepts the offer, then he chooses the 
quality levels (q1, q2) for the delivered good. In implementing the experiment, the 
accept/reject decision and the choice of quality are separated into two sub-steps, to 
simplify the interface for the seller. 
Step 3: Buyer’s Discretionary Payment 
                                                 
6 In the theoretical model, the formal bonus is incentive-compatible (inducing the desired behavior from the 
seller) when f ≥ C(q1R, qmin) – Cmin. The buyer would not offer a non-incentive-compatible formal bonus, 
because to do so would incur the contracting cost without affecting the seller’s behavior. However, 
incentive-compatibility was not enforced in implementing the experiment. Thus, the subjects were free to 
offer any f they chose. 
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Once the buyer observes the quality delivered by the seller, he chooses the 
amount he will actually pay for the discretionary bonus (d). The discretionary bonus 
specified in the offer is not binding (i.e. d ≠ dR is allowed); the buyer can choose any 
amount he wishes from 0 to 200. No discretionary payment is allowed if either party exits 
(i.e. following no exchange). 
The following table summarizes the buyer’s and seller’s payoffs. 
 
 
 
Offer Type Quality Buyer’s Payoff Seller’s Payoff 
No exchange  0 20 
Formal (f > 0) Actual q1 ≥ requested q1R V − p – f – d − x p – C + f + d 
 Actual q1 < requested q1R V − p – d − x p – C + d 
Informal (f = 0) Buyer exit or seller reject V – p – d p – C + d 
 
Table 3: Experimental Payoffs 
 
 
 
All payoffs are given in points. Subjects were paid in cash at the end of the 
experiment, at the rate of 50 points = $1. In addition to the points earned from exchange, 
each subject was given a 250-point starting balance, plus a $7 show-up fee.7
Based on the theoretically predicted behavior, the average player in the lowest-
paying treatment (S) should earn 26 points per period. The average player in the highest-
paying session (L) should earn 35 points per period. Based on an average duration of 15 
periods (see below), the average subject should earn approximately $21-$22, including 
the starting balance and show-up fee. 
 
At the end of each period, there is an exogenous chance that the relationship will 
terminate. The probability that the relationship continues is δ = 0.667 or 0.9, depending 
on the treatment. If the relationship continues (i.e. does not terminate), then the subjects 
repeat the stage game with the same partners. This chance for continuation creates a 
repeated game of uncertain duration, which is structurally equivalent to an infinitely 
repeated game with discounting. If the relationship terminates, then either the subjects are 
randomly reassigned to new partners (creating a new relationship) or the session ends. All 
pairs use the same random draw for termination, so all subjects’ relationships will be of 
the same length. 
                                                 
7 For the last 6 sessions (3 of treatment L and 3 of treatment LX), the subjects were paid $12 as a show-up 
fee, because the high-δ sessions had proven to last significantly longer than the S and SX sessions. Since 
the extra $5 was paid as a lump sum, it should not have altered the subjects’ behavior in the later sessions. 
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For the δ = 0.667 treatments, the first termination to occur in or after period 10 
will lead to one final repetition of the treatment. In other words, only one new 
relationship will begin after period 10. For the δ = 0.9 treatments, the first termination in 
or after period 5 signals the start of the last relationship. The subjects were notified when 
the final relationship began.8
 
 
Treatments 
The treatment variables are the transaction cost, x, and the probability of 
continuation, δ. Each variable takes on one of two possible values, giving rise to four 
treatments. In the S treatment, the contracting cost is x = 0 and the probability of 
continuation is δ = 0.667. In the SX treatment, the contracting cost is x = 35 and the 
probability of continuation is δ = 0.667. In the L treatment, the contracting cost is x = 0 
and the probability of continuation is δ = 0.9. In the LX treatment, the contracting cost is 
x = 35 and the probability of continuation is δ = 0.9. 
This set of treatments allows for the analysis of the two determinants of contract 
choice discussed earlier. With δ as a treatment variable, the impact of the expected length 
of partnerships on contract choice and welfare can be evaluated. Likewise, varying x 
across treatments allows for testing of theoretical predictions about the impacts of 
changing the availability of formal incentives. By applying the specifications of the 
experimental design to the model developed earlier, we determine the theoretical 
equilibrium for each of the treatments. These predicted outcomes, in turn, allow me to 
form hypotheses that can be tested with the data from the sessions. 
 
First-Best 
When transactions costs are positive (x > 0), the first-best outcome in each period 
is for the buyer to offer an unconditional contract (i.e. f = 0) and for the seller to supply 
the highest possible quality (10, 10). That produces the maximum joint surplus of 70, 
which will be allocated between the parties by the terms of the agreement. When 
transaction costs are zero (x = 0), a conditional contract (f > 0) could also be used in the 
first-best outcome to achieve quality of (10, 10). 
 
                                                 
8 For 3 of the 19 sessions, the session had to be ended when the maximum time was reached, rather than 
because the random draw indicated termination. In these 3 sessions, the subjects were notified at the 
beginning of the final session, and the data for those periods was deleted before analysis. 
20 
 
Treatment S 
In treatment S, the values of the treatment parameters are δ = 0.667 and x = 0, so 
S features short duration and low contracting cost relative to the other treatments. For the 
stage game, the equilibrium outcome is a conditional contract which the seller accepts, 
providing quality of (10, 1) and receiving total payment of p + f = 78, where the formal 
bonus is f ≥ 45 contingent on delivery of q1 = 10. In this equilibrium, the buyer earns a 
payoff of 32 and the seller earns a payoff of 20 (equal to his reservation payoff). 
In the repeated game, the equilibrium outcome is the same as that of the stage 
game. The relatively attractive stage game outcome means that the buyer’s punishment 
for deviation from a relational contract is mild. Thus, he cannot credibly promise to pay a 
discretionary bonus in return for the seller delivering higher quality; the incentive to 
cheat and withhold the bonus is too great to support such an equilibrium. 
The buyer could feasibly achieve a higher-quality outcome by paying a rent to the 
seller (i.e. total payment greater than the seller’s cost plus reservation level). However, 
such an arrangement is non-optimal for the buyer since the necessary additional payment 
would be greater than the benefit he receives from the higher quality. 
 
Treatment SX 
In treatment SX, the values of the treatment parameters are δ = 0.667 and x = 35, 
so SX features short duration and high contracting cost relative to the other treatments. 
For the stage game, the equilibrium outcome is no exchange. In this equilibrium, the 
buyer earns a payoff of 0 and the seller earns a payoff of 20 (equal to his reservation 
payoff). The high transaction cost (x = 35) effectively precludes the use of the formal 
bonus in the stage game (and in the repeated game) and the discretionary bonus is non-
credible. Without those performance-based incentives, the seller would supply only Q = 
(1, 1), which does not generate enough joint surplus to support an individually rational 
exchange (i.e. one or both parties would earn less than their reservation payoffs). 
In the repeated game, however, the buyer is able to promise a discretionary bonus 
that will induce higher quality from the seller. Since the stage game outcome is relatively 
unattractive, the buyer has little incentive to deviate from the equilibrium by withholding 
the promised bonus. In this context, the equilibrium outcome is an unconditional contract 
that the seller accepts, providing quality of (10, 5) and receiving total payments of p + d = 
110, with f = 0 and d ≥ 77. In this equilibrium, the buyer earns a payoff of 40 and the 
seller earns a payoff of 20. 
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Treatment L 
In treatment L, the values of the treatment parameters are δ = 0.9 and x = 0, so L 
features long duration and low contracting cost relative to the other treatments. For the 
stage game, the equilibrium outcome is a conditional contract requesting quality of (10, 
1) and total payment of p + f = 78, where the formal bonus is f ≥ 45 contingent on 
delivery of q1 = 10. In this equilibrium, the buyer earns a payoff of 32 and the seller earns 
a payoff of 20 (equal to his reservation payoff). 
In the repeated game, however, the buyer is able to promise a discretionary bonus 
that will induce higher quality from the seller. Relative to treatment S, the higher 
probability of continuation makes this discretionary payment credible as part of the 
equilibrium strategy. A higher continuation probability increases the value of the buyer’s 
future payoffs in excess of the stage game payoffs (his deviation payoffs), so he becomes 
less willing to deviate from the relational contract equilibrium. 
In this treatment, the equilibrium outcome is a conditional contract that the seller 
accepts, providing quality of (10, 10) and receiving total payments of p + f + d = 150, 
with f ≥ 45 and d ≥ 72. In this equilibrium, the buyer earns a payoff of 50 and the seller 
earns a payoff of 20. 
 
Treatment LX 
In treatment LX, the values of the treatment parameters are δ = 0.9 and x = 35, so 
LX features long duration and high contracting cost relative to the other treatments. For 
the stage game, the equilibrium outcome is no exchange. In this equilibrium, the buyer 
earns a payoff of 0 and the seller earns a payoff of 20 (equal to his reservation payoff). 
The high transaction cost (x = 35) effectively precludes the use of the formal bonus in the 
stage game (and in the repeated game) and the discretionary bonus is non-credible. 
Without those performance-based incentives, the seller would supply only Q = (1, 1), 
which does not generate enough joint surplus to support an individually rational exchange 
(i.e. one or both parties would earn less than their reservation payoffs). 
In the repeated game, however, the buyer is able to promise a discretionary bonus 
that will induce higher quality from the seller. Since the stage game outcome is relatively 
unattractive, the buyer has little incentive to deviate from the equilibrium by withholding 
the promised bonus. Relative to treatment SX, the higher probability of continuation 
means that even higher quality levels can be supported in equilibrium under treatment 
LX. In this context, the equilibrium outcome is an unconditional contract that the seller 
accepts, providing quality of (10, 10) and receiving total payments of p + d = 150, with f 
= 0 and d ≥ 117. In this equilibrium, the buyer earns a payoff of 50 and the seller earns a 
payoff of 20. 
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Hypotheses 
Expected Duration 
When parties anticipate longer working relationships, the relational incentives 
stemming from promises or threats about future payoffs should be stronger. These 
improved incentives should, in turn, allow the parties to achieve more efficient outcomes. 
The efficiency of the outcomes can be measured by the parties’ joint surplus, i.e. the sum 
of the buyer’s and seller’s payoffs for a period. The quality levels in a particular 
transaction are also related to the efficiency of the outcome. 
In the experiment, the expected duration is captured by the treatment variable δ, 
reflecting the probability of continuing with the same partner in the following period. The 
high-δ treatments (L and LX) should achieve more efficient outcomes than the low-δ 
treatments (S and SX). 
Hypothesis 1 – Joint surplus and quality will be higher in treatment L than in S, 
and also higher in LX than in SX. 
Another aspect of the outcome is the distribution of welfare between the parties. 
Net payoffs can be defined as each party’s payoff reduced by his reservation payoff, 
reflecting that party’s gains from making an exchange. Net surplus can then be defined as 
the sum of the two parties’ net payoffs, and the division of this net surplus between the 
parties can be analyzed. 
In the theoretical model, the buyer captures all of the net surplus because he 
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. In experimental settings, however, it is common for the 
offer recipient to require more than her reservation payoff to acquiesce to the offer. Thus, 
it is likely that there will be some sharing of the net surplus between the buyer and seller. 
The theoretical model provide little or no guidance on this issue, since it predicts 100% of 
the net surplus will go to the buyer, but the empirical observations may provide some 
useful insights. 
Hypothesis 2 – All net surplus will be captured by the buyer, so the seller’s payoff 
will be equal to her reservation level. 
Contract Cost 
When formal incentives are more difficult to use, the parties in long-term 
interactions rely more heavily on informal incentives. In the experiment, this difficulty is 
captured by x, the cost of using the formal bonus. In the theoretical model, the buyer 
completely forgoes the use of the formal bonus in the high-cost treatments. In the low-
cost treatments, the buyer should always use the formal bonus. 
Hypothesis 3 – Use of the formal bonus will be less frequent in treatment LX than 
in L, and less frequent in SX than in S. 
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The effect of the contract cost, x, on the efficiency of outcomes is more 
complicated. As discussed in the theoretical model, the cost affects the feasibility 
conditions in two ways. It has a direct effect on the feasibility condition for conditional 
contracts, (C5), via the + x term on the right-hand side of the inequality. This effect 
reflects the greater difficulty in using formal incentives when their transactions costs are 
high. Considering this effect, a higher cost makes high quality less feasible using 
conditional contracts. When conditional contracts are preferred to unconditional 
contracts, this effect tends to reduce the quality that the parties can achieve. When 
unconditional contracts are preferred, raising the transaction cost does not produce this 
effect on quality and net surplus. 
However, the contract cost can also have an indirect effect on the feasibility 
conditions of both the conditional and unconditional contracts via its impact on the stage-
game equilibrium. This effect enters via the Πstage term in the right-hand sides of (U5) and 
(C5). A higher contract cost decreases the attractiveness of using a formal bonus in a one-
shot interaction, reducing the payoff available to buyer via formal incentives. When the 
stage-game outcome is based on using the formal incentive, this effect increases the 
punishment that a buyer faces for reneging on a promised discretionary bonus. 
Based upon the equilibria predicted in the theoretical model, treatment LX 
outcomes should show the same welfare measures as do L outcomes. However, the 
feasibility constraint is looser for any given quality level in L than in LX, indicating that 
high quality is “more feasible” under L. Thus, we would expect L to produce better 
outcomes to the extent that the behavior under the two treatments is different. This 
expected difference in outcomes between L and LX corresponds to the complementarity 
effect noted by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994). 
Hypothesis 4 – The joint surplus and quality in treatment L will be greater than or 
equal to those in treatment LX. 
In the model, treatment SX results in more efficient outcomes than does S, 
because of the effect that the transaction cost has on the buyer’s incentive-compatibility 
constraint. In treatment S, the lack of a transaction cost means that the buyer could use a 
formal bonus to induce reasonably good outcomes in the stage game. However, that 
weakens his incentive to comply with a promised discretionary bonus in a repeated 
interaction. In treatment SX, the poor stage outcome (no exchange) creates a harsher 
punishment for deviations in the repeated game, thus allowing the buyer to more credibly 
promise a discretionary bonus for high quality. This expected difference in outcomes 
between S and SX corresponds to the substitution effect noted by Baker, Gibbons, and 
Murphy (1994) and Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995). 
Hypothesis 5 – The joint surplus and quality in treatment S will be less than those 
in treatment SX. 
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Experimental Results 
Table 4 below presents a summary of the data observed in the four treatments. 
The unit of analysis is a partnership-period. There were 1,467 observations, of which 806 
resulted in an exchange. 
 
 
 
 S SX L LX 
Offer % 0.96 0.91 0.93 0.87 
Accept % 0.69 0.46 0.68 0.55 
Formal % 0.91 0.40 0.95 0.40 
Desired q1 9.07 8.35 9.00 9.18 
Desired q2 6.54 6.37 5.09 7.56 
Actual q1 8.58 6.35 8.41 7.97 
Actual q2 4.57 3.79 3.46 5.18 
Buyer’s payoff 24.75 3.36 16.39 12.56 
Seller’s payoff 27.29 21.95 32.55 23.82 
Net surplus 32.04 5.32 28.94 16.38 
Buyer % 0.77 0.63 0.57 0.77 
 
Table 4: Summary Data for Experiment 
 
 
 
In Table 4, Offer % shows the proportion of periods in which the buyer made an 
offer. Accept % shows the proportion of those offers that were accepted by the seller. The 
remaining variables are restricted to offers that were accepted. Formal % is the 
proportion of accepted offers that used the formal bonus, meaning that a formal bonus 
greater than 0 was promised in the offer. Desired q1 and Desired q2 are the average 
quality levels specified in the buyer’s offer (ranging from 1 to 10). Actual q1 and Actual 
q2 are the average quality levels delivered by the seller. Buyer’s payoff and Seller’s payoff 
are the average earnings (in points) per period. Net surplus is the sum of the parties’ 
payoffs less their reservation values. Buyer % shows the proportion of the net surplus 
captured by the buyer. 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 4 are indicative of the overall results. 
Formal hypothesis tests and regression analyses were conducted and are discussed in the 
following sections. Kruskal-Wallis hypothesis tests for the differences among treatments 
are provided in Table 10 (at end of paper). 
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Choice of Contract Structure 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that use of the formal bonus will be less frequent in 
treatments SX and LX, when it is more costly, than in treatments S and L. The data 
strongly support this hypothesis. In both of the low-cost treatments, use of the formal 
bonus was approximately 90%, very close to the theoretical benchmark of 100%. In the 
high-cost treatments, use of the formal bonus was approximately 40%, markedly lower 
than in S and L but still higher than the theoretical benchmark of 0%. Kruskal-Wallis 
tests indicate that the differences in the use of the formal incentive between S and SX and 
between L and LX are significant (p < 0.001 in both cases). 
The institutional environment affects the choice of contract structure by 
influencing the types of agreements that will be feasible and, ultimately, the payoff that 
each party expects to earn. In this experiment, the buyer has sole control over the 
structure of the contract offered, so his potential payoff under the various contractual 
structures is paramount. In general, the buyer is expected to choose the contractual 
structure that offers him the greatest payoff. 
This intuition can be tested by within-treatment comparisons of the outcomes for 
buyers who chose to use formal incentives and those for buyers who did not. Table 5 
presents the results for these comparisons, with F representing the partition within a 
treatment of accepted contracts that contained a formal bonus and No F representing the 
partition containing those that omitted the formal incentive. The p-value shows the results 
of a Kruskal-Wallis hypothesis test regarding the difference between the F and No F 
partitions within each treatment. 
 
 
 
  
 
n 
Desired 
q1 
Desired 
q2 
Actual 
q1 
Actual 
q2 
Buyer’s 
Payoff 
Seller’s 
Payoff 
Net 
Surplus 
S 
F 202 9.28 6.41 8.89 4.39 25.53 27.69 33.23 
No F 20 6.95 7.85 5.45 6.40 16.85 23.20 20.05 
p-value  < 0.001 0.162 < 0.001 0.069 0.055 0.508 0.035 
SX 
F 52 8.40 6.67 6.52 3.62 -14.10 18.92 -15.17 
No F 78 8.31 6.17 6.23 3.91 15.00 23.97 18.97 
p-value  0.761 0.346 0.558 0.628 < 0.001 0.189 < 0.001 
L 
F 241 9.09 4.98 8.68 3.59 19.61 30.96 30.57 
No F 13 7.38 7.00 3.31 1.08 -43.23 61.92 -1.31 
p-value  0.005 0.038 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
LX 
F 79 9.19 7.03 8.33 4.13 1.19 13.71 -5.10 
No F 121 9.17 7.91 7.74 5.86 19.98 30.42 30.40 
p-value  0.298 0.010 0.706 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
 
Table 5: Effects of Contract Choice 
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In treatments SX and LX, buyers using the formal incentives had significantly 
lower payoffs than did those who used only informal incentives. Interestingly, the 
average quality levels induced by the two contractual structures were similar within each 
treatment, so the differences in net surplus were very close to the transaction cost of x = 
35. Differences in actual q1 were not significant at standard confidence levels, while the 
difference in q2 was significant for treatment LX, but not for SX. 
For treatments S and L, using the formal bonus improved outcomes, generally 
increasing quality levels and the buyer’s earnings. These differences were generally 
significant at standard levels, except in treatment S where differences in actual q2 and 
buyer’s payoff were somewhat outside the p = 0.05 threshold. Some caution in 
interpreting these results is warranted, since there were relatively few observations 
without the formal incentive in these two treatments. 
A comparison of the high- and low-cost treatments therefore suggests that the 
buyers generally did respond to the payoff potential in selecting which incentives to offer, 
although the usage of formal incentives was substantially higher in absolute terms in 
treatments SX and LX than the theoretical predictions suggest. This result is consistent 
with the strategic ambiguity theory of Bernheim and Whinston (1998). 
One phenomenon sometimes observed in experiments is that subjects go through 
a learning period. In such cases, their behavior may deviate substantially from the 
theoretical equilibrium in earlier periods, but over time they learn from their experiences, 
adjusting their choices to converge toward the outcome predicted by theory. 
Table 11 (end of paper) presents the results from comparing subjects’ earlier 
decisions to their later ones. For each treatment, the data was partitioned into two groups. 
Early observations are those up to and including the 8th period in each session, which is 
the shortest duration of any of the sessions. Later observations are those occurring after 
the 8th period. Table 11 shows the mean choices for these partitions in each treatment, as 
well as Kruskal-Wallis hypothesis tests for the differences between the early and later 
observations. 
With regard to the choice of contract structure, use of the formal incentive 
appeared to be increasing over time in treatments S and L and decreasing for SX and LX. 
However, only for treatment S was the difference in usage significant at standard levels. 
Figure 1 illustrates these trends, presenting the average frequency of using the formal 
incentive by period. Note that later periods contained fewer observations. 
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Figure 1: Use of Formal Incentives Over Time 
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Effects of Institutions on Welfare and Efficiency 
The treatment variables represent exogenous institutional characteristics that 
affect the choices of the contracting parties, which in turn affect the gains they realize 
from participating in exchange. From Hypothesis 1, a longer expected length of 
partnerships is predicted to improve the net surplus and quality levels achieved by the 
parties. As Table 5 shows, the subjects did achieve more efficient outcomes in treatment 
LX than they did in SX. Kruskal-Wallis tests indicate that the differences are significant 
(p < 0.001 for actual q1 and net surplus, p < 0.002 for actual q2). These results are 
generally consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model, in which the difference 
between the equilibrium outcomes for SX and LX stems from the improved effectiveness 
of informal incentives when the expected duration is longer. Although the model predicts 
that actual q1 will be the same for these two treatments, the equality is an artifact of 
reaching a corner solution, since the predicted q1 is the maximum allowed. The 
experimental results suggest that an improvement in informal incentives may also 
improve the verifiable quality (q1) that the parties can achieve, at least in the context of 
the high-cost treatments. 
The data are mixed with respect to treatments L and S and Hypothesis 1. For the 
quality and net surplus variables, treatment S showed results approximately equal to or 
better than those for treatment L. Kruskal-Wallis tests indicate that the differences are 
significant with respect to actual q2 (p = 0.023) and net surplus (p < 0.001), but not with 
respect to actual q1 (p = 0.096). According to the model, the q1 achieved in these 
treatments should be similar and high, which is consistent with the data. However, the 
model predicts that actual q2 and net surplus will be higher under treatment L than under 
S, while the opposite was observed in the experiment. This results contrasts with the 
notion that longer expected durations would improve the outcomes achieved. 
Learning effects may contribute somewhat to reconciling the observations with 
the theoretical predictions. From Table 11, the mean q2 appears to be decreasing over 
time for treatment S and increasing over time for L, although only the former is 
significant at standard levels. As a result, the net surplus is increasing under treatment L 
(p < 0.001) but not under treatment S. 
It is also to be expected that theoretical predictions about the effect of expected 
duration would be stronger for the high-cost treatments (SX and LX) than for the low-
cost treatments. In the high-cost treatments, the outcomes depend more heavily on the use 
of informal incentives, since the formal bonus is costly and therefore used less. Expected 
duration is an important factor in the effectiveness of relational contracting and informal 
incentives, so the difference between SX and LX should make a large impact in this 
context. For the low-cost treatments, on the other hand, the formal incentive plays a 
larger role and the expected duration matters little for its efficacy. Thus, one would 
expect the impact of expected duration to be less in the comparison between S and L, and 
possibly outweighed by other factors not incorporated into the theoretical model.  
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In additional to the total amount of net surplus (i.e. efficiency), its division 
between the parties is important in analyzing their welfare. As stated in Hypothesis 2, the 
theoretical model predicts that the buyer will capture the entire net surplus, leaving the 
seller with only her reservation payoff in each period. However, a common phenomenon 
in experimental settings is that subjects share net surplus to greater degree than predicted 
by a model of rational, self-interested agents.9
In this experiment, the buyer received the majority of the net surplus but less than 
100%, ranging from 57% (in treatment L) to 77% (in LX) of the net surplus. These values 
are consistent with the idea that some sharing will occur, rather than the buyer capturing 
the entire surplus via a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The amount of sharing does not seem to 
be obviously correlated with the expected duration, the contracting cost, or the size of the 
net surplus. 
 
The other treatment variable is the contracting cost, which represents the 
availability of effective third-party enforcement mechanisms for formal incentives. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 express the complementarity and substitution hypotheses, 
respectively, discussed in the previous literature. In general, the subjects’ behavior 
provides some evidence for a complementarity effect and argues against a substitution 
effect. 
Hypothesis 4 (complementarity) predicts that quality levels and net surplus will 
be higher in treatment L than in LX. The theoretical mechanism underlying this 
prediction is that the formal incentive not only induces high q1 directly, but that it also 
strengthens informal incentives used to promote higher q2. This strengthening occurs for 
two reasons. First, the presence of the formal incentive reduces the seller’s potential gain 
from deviation, because the savings in cost is partially offset by a reduction in payment 
(the forgone bonus). Second, it reduces the buyer’s incentive to withhold payment, 
because less of the total payment is discretionary, decreasing the buyer’s potential gains 
from deviation. 
As seen in Table 4, the net surplus achieved in treatment L was higher than that in 
LX, and the difference was statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis p < 0.001), as 
predicted by the model. The apparent difference with respect to actual q1 is not 
significant (p = 0.87), again consistent with the theoretical model. However, the actual q2 
was lower in treatment L than in LX, which is inconsistent with the model and the notion 
of a complementarity effect. 
These results raise the question of how the treatment L subjects were able to 
achieve higher net surplus when their average q1 was similar to that of the treatment LX 
subjects and their average q2 was lower. Given the functional forms for the buyer’s value 
and the seller’s cost, the q1 dimension of quality has a substantially greater impact on net 
surplus than does the q2 dimension. Thus, the higher average q1 in L, although 
                                                 
9 Wu and Roe (2007a) report a very similar result, also in an experiment with a contracting game. 
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statistically insignificant, partially offset the lower q2. Perhaps more importantly, those 
buyers in LX who did use the formal incentive incurred a large contracting cost, which 
decreased the net surplus for given quality levels. 
In order to control for the effects of the contracting cost on the net surplus, we 
make another comparison using only those LX observations that did not use the formal 
incentive. The results are presented in Table 6.10
 
 
 
 
 L (All) LX (No F only) p-value 
DesiredQ1 9.00 9.17 0.016 
DesiredQ2 5.09 7.91 < 0.001 
Q1 8.41 7.74 0.667 
Q2 3.46 5.86 < 0.001 
BEarn 16.39 19.98 < 0.001 
SEarn 32.55 30.42 0.725 
NetSurplus 28.94 30.40 0.014 
 
Table 6: Test for Complementarity Effect 
 
 
 
The results for actual q1 and q2 are similar to those of the previous comparison: no 
significant difference for q1 and LX has a higher q2. However, the net surplus can be 
more easily compared because none of the observations incur a contracting cost. In this 
case, the subset of LX has a slightly but significantly higher net surplus than does L. 
Thus, the difference between the net surpluses in the prior comparison is primarily 
attributable to the payment of the contracting cost in treatment LX, rather than a 
complementarity between the formal and informal incentives in L. 
As mentioned earlier, one possible consideration in reconciling the observations 
to theoretical predictions is learning effects. From Table 11, it appears that q1 is 
increasing over time for both L and LX (p < 0.001). However, only treatment LX shows a 
significant increase in q2 over time (p = 0.012). Thus, it may be that the absence of a 
complementarity effect is due in part to subjects’ insufficient experience with this 
particular decision-making situation. 
                                                 
10 Another possible comparison is to use only the observations conforming to the equilibrium contract 
structures in both treatments. The results were very similar to those presented in Table 7, because 90% of 
the treatment L buyers used the formal incentive. 
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An assumption underlying the theoretical model is that, in equilibrium, 
cooperation occurs from the initial period of the partnership. If the parties fail to 
coordinate, and particularly if such a failure varies systematically across treatments, then 
that failed assumption may account for some of the observed deviation from the 
predictions of the model. This line of reasoning can be investigated by partitioning the 
data to include only those partnerships that display cooperation initially. 
Table 12 (at end of paper) presents a comparison of the treatments based on such 
a partition. Initial cooperation is defined to occur when the seller accepts an offer and 
provides at least the requested quality on both dimensions in the initial period of the 
partnership, regardless of what may occur in later periods. Of the 243 partnerships in the 
data, 60 met this criterion of initial cooperation. 
Among initial cooperators, a comparison of treatments L and LX does present 
some support for a complementarity effect. Treatment L has a significantly higher q1 than 
does LX (p = 0.004), while there is no significant difference in q2. The difference in net 
surplus, although still affected by the contracting cost paid by some buyers in LX, now 
reflects an underlying improvement in quality. This difference is consistent with an 
improvement in the informal incentives brought about by better availability of the formal 
incentive. Thus, the complementarity effect does appear to be present to some degree, 
although it is not robust in the face of coordination failures among the parties. 
Turning to the substitution effect, Hypothesis 5 predicts that quality levels and net 
surplus will be higher in treatment SX than in S. The theoretical mechanism underlying 
this prediction is that relative unavailability of formal incentives in SX greatly reduces 
the buyer’s payoff in the stage game, thus increasing the severity of the punishment he 
faces for deviation and allowing the seller to better trust that high quality will be 
rewarded via the discretionary bonus. In treatment S, by contrast, the stage game is 
relatively rewarding for the buyer, so the seller should have less faith in the buyer’s 
promise to pay the discretionary bonus. 
Table 5 shows results opposite to those predicted: subjects in treatment S 
achieved better results on both quality dimensions and on net surplus than did those in 
SX. Kruskal-Wallis tests indicate that the differences are significant for actual q1 and net 
surplus (p < 0.001 for both). This observation casts serious doubt regarding the presence 
of the substitution effect as predicted by the model. 
As before, we investigate possible explanations for the divergence between the 
observations and the theory. One possible factor is learning effects. From Table 15, actual 
q1 seems to be increasing over time in treatment S while actual q2 is decreasing. The 
overall effect on net surplus is ambiguous. There are no significant learning trends for 
treatment SX. Thus, learning effects do not present a compelling explanation for the 
divergence. 
32 
 
We also consider the assumption of initial cooperation, as we did in the analysis 
of the complementarity hypothesis. In the sub-samples restricted to initial cooperation, 
presented in Table 12, the observed behavior is similar to that in the broader subject 
population. Both quality levels and net surplus are higher in treatment S than in SX (p < 
0.001 for all three comparisons), suggesting that the absence of the substitution effect is 
not merely a failure of the parties to coordinate in the early rounds of the partnership. 
The results in the theoretical model rely heavily on reversion to the stage-game 
outcomes as the basis for punishing uncooperative behavior. The substitution effect, in 
particular, relies on the difference between credible punishments in treatments S and SX. 
The model assumes that the worst credible punishment will be enacted in a trigger-
strategy response to deviations from the terms of the relational contract. If the subjects’ 
expectations about punishment do not conform to this assumption, then the substitution 
effect could fail. The subjects’ use of punishment is explored in the next section. 
 
Shirking and Punishment 
There are two situations in which a subject might punish his partner for deviation 
from the relational contract. First, if a buyer deviates by reneging on the promised 
discretionary payment after the seller has delivered the promised quality, then the seller 
may punish the buyer. Second, if the seller “shirks” by supplying less than the promised 
quality, then the buyer may punish the seller. Punishment can take several forms. After a 
seller’s deviation, the buyer can withhold payment of the discretionary bonus. After 
either party’s deviation, punishment may take the form of terminating the relationship 
(i.e. no exchange) or continuing on less favorable terms. On the latter issue, the 
theoretical model provides clear predictions that deviation in the high-cost treatments will 
lead to termination, since a formal-incentive based exchange is not feasible, whereas 
deviation in the low-cost treatments will lead to exchange based on the formal incentive 
only. 
Table 7 presents a comparison of the seller’s acceptance rates following periods in 
which the seller performed as promised and the buyer either conformed by paying the 
promised discretionary bonus or deviated by paying less (or nothing). 
 
 
 
 S SX L LX 
Buyer conformed 0.76563 0.4255 0.7525 0.70833 
Buyer deviated 0.71111 0.31 0.669 0.4491 
 
Table 7: Seller’s Acceptance Rates Indicating Punishment 
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At first appearances, these differences among treatments in punishment by the 
seller appear to be consistent with the theoretical model. In treatments SX and LX, the 
stage-game outcome is no exchange, and the sellers exhibited much lower acceptance 
rates after a buyer deviation than after conforming behavior. In treatments S and L, by 
contrast, the stage-game outcome is exchange based solely on the formal incentive. In 
these treatments, the difference in sellers’ acceptance rates is much smaller. However, 
this simple comparison ignores the issue of whether the contracts offered after deviation 
were less attractive to sellers. To investigate this aspect of seller’s behavior, we estimated 
a logit model for the probability of the seller accepting a contract in periods after the 
seller had performed as promised. The explanatory variables include the terms of the 
contract (payment terms and requested quality level) and dummy variables for treatment 
effects. The dummy variable for S is dropped to avoid the dummy variable trap, so it 
becomes the baseline for comparison. The effect of primary interest is a dummy variable 
for whether the buyer paid less than the promised discretionary bonus, which is then 
interacted with dummy variables for the treatments. (Again, S serves as the baseline for 
comparison.) Since the game is repeated, the regressors also include variables to capture 
possible effects from the parties’ history, including the seller’s prior-period earnings and 
the duration of the partnership to that point. We control for possible learning effects by 
including linear and quadratic variables for the period. 
Table 13 (at end of paper) shows the results of this estimation. As expected, 
higher payment terms increase the probability of the seller accepting the contract, 
although the effect of a promised discretionary bonus is significant at a lower level and 
has a smaller magnitude than the other two, possibly indicating that sellers did not trust 
buyers to uphold those promises. None of the estimated coefficients for the buyer’s 
deviation were significant, and a Wald test did not reject the hypothesis that all four of 
these coefficients were jointly equal to 0 (p = 0.784). This result argues against the 
assumption in the model that sellers use rejection to punish deviating buyers. The lack of 
a credible threat of rejection means that buyers have more motivation to withhold 
discretionary bonuses, even after satisfactory performances by the sellers, thereby 
weakening the use of informal incentives to achieve higher-quality outcomes. In 
particular, this result shows one possible reason for why the substitution effect was not 
observed in the experimental data. The substitution hypothesis relies on the threat of 
rejection to create harsher penalties for the buyer’s deviation in treatments L and LX, 
thereby strengthening the power of informal incentives in those environments. If this 
threat is absent, then the ability of formal incentives to reduce the seller’s potential gains 
from deviations and thus increase the efficacy of informal incentives (the 
complementarity effect) dominates the interaction between these two types of incentives. 
Table 8 compares the buyers’ decision to pay or withhold the promised 
discretionary bonus, depending on whether the seller met quality specifications or not. 
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Since both the discretionary bonus payment and the quality levels chosen are 
(approximately) continuous variables, we categorize the seller’s actions as either 
conforming (providing at least the promised quality on both dimensions) or shirking 
(providing less than promised quality on at least one dimension). Similarly, the buyer’s 
actions are categorized as either withholding (paying less than the promised bonus) or 
not. 
 
 
 
 S SX L LX 
Seller conformed 0.42056 0.28205 0.47552 0.38542 
Seller shirked 0.85217 0.86813 0.78378 0.85577 
 
Table 8: Buyers’ Withholding of Discretionary Bonus as Punishment 
 
 
 
As expected, the buyers in all treatments tended to withhold the discretionary 
bonus payment much more frequently after shirking than after conforming behavior. In 
order to analyze the buyer’s behavior more fully, we estimated a logit model for the 
probability of the buyer paying less than the promised discretionary bonus. From the 
buyer’s incentive-compatibility constraints in the model, (C5) and (U5), the buyer should 
weigh his expected payoffs in future periods under the relational contract against the 
short-term gain from not paying the bonus and then receiving stage-game payoffs in the 
future. To represent the buyer’s expected payoffs under the relational contract, we use his 
payoff under the current contract, V(Q) – p – f – d – x, with f and x set to zero if he is 
operating under an unconditional contract. V(Q) is the buyer’s value for the quality 
actually delivered by the seller in the current period. Note that the amount of the 
discretionary bonus enters both sides of the tradeoff, but it has a larger impact on the 
deviation payoff due to discounting. The estimation model also includes dummy 
variables for treatment effects, with treatment S dropped, so that it becomes the baseline 
for comparison. The effect of primary interest is a dummy variable for whether the seller 
shirked by providing less than the promised quality (on either dimension). To capture 
possible effects from the parties’ history, the regressors include the buyer’s prior-period 
earnings and the duration of the partnership to that point. We include linear and quadratic 
terms for the period to control for possible learning effects. 
The results of this estimation are presented in Table 14 (at end of paper). The 
coefficient estimates for V(Q), price, and the formal bonus are all significant and of the 
expected sign, suggesting that buyers do respond to these as indicators of what they can 
expect as payoffs in future periods under relational contracts. The contract fee parameter 
estimate is positive, as expected, although not significant. The estimate for the 
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discretionary bonus is positive, indicating that higher promised amounts increase the 
buyers’ incentives to renege on those promises. Also, the results suggest that buyers do 
withhold discretionary payments as a response to shirking by sellers. 
The incentive-compatibility constraints in the theoretical model suggest that, 
ceteris paribus, the buyer should be more likely to renege on the discretionary bonus in 
treatments S and L than in SX and LX, due to differences in the stage-game payoffs. In 
the first group, the stage-game payoff is relatively attractive, because the low contracting 
cost makes possible a profitable exchange based solely on the formal incentive. In the 
second group, by contrast, it is impossible to construct an exchange that is advantageous 
for both parties, so a reversion to stage-game outcome would be more costly to the buyer. 
However, there seems to be little or no difference in the treatment effects for the buyer’s 
probability of withholding payment. A Wald test did not reject the hypothesis that all of 
the treatment effects were equal (p = 0.308). This result is consistent with the analysis 
that indicates unwillingness by the seller’s to use rejection as a punishment mechanism; if 
buyers expect that sellers will not increase rejection rates in response to withholding of 
payments, then the differences among treatments in the stage-game payoffs become much 
less relevant in the buyer’s decision. 
In addition to withholding discretionary payments, buyers can punish shirking by 
their actions in subsequent periods, either terminating the relationship altogether or 
offering less attractive contracts to the seller. Table 9 compares buyers’ offer rates in the 
periods following either shirking or conforming behavior by the seller. 
 
 
 
  S SX L LX 
Seller conformed 0.95062 0.89091 0.91698 0.82699 
Seller shirked 0.96429 0.90769 0.94898 0.95833 
 
 
Table 9: Buyers’ Offer Rates as Punishment 
 
 
 
Surprisingly, the buyers do not generally appear to punish shirking by 
withholding offers in the following period. In fact, the mean offer rates were slightly 
higher in periods following shirking. Again, a simple comparison of offer rates glosses 
over the important issue of whether the terms of the offer varied with prior shirking, an 
issue explored below, but this result indicates that punishment by terminating the 
relationship does not seem to occur as the theoretical model assumes for treatments SX 
and LX. 
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Another mechanism for punishment involves continuing the relationship, but at 
terms less favorable to the deviating party. In treatments S and L, for example, the worst 
credible punishment threat in the model is exchange based solely on the formal 
incentives. That is, a high q1 is induced by use of the formal bonus, but q2 = qmin, because 
the discretionary bonus and other informal incentives are ignored. 
Table 15 (at end of paper) compares the terms of offers made in periods following 
cooperation with those following deviations (shirking or reneging). Note that there are 
few instances in which the seller shirked but the buyer did not withhold the discretionary 
bonus, which is consistent with the earlier observation about the buyer’s tendency to use 
withholding to punish shirking sellers. Thus, the variance is relatively high for that subset 
of the data in each treatment. From an inspection of Table 15, some general patterns can 
be observed. In treatments S and LX, the desired q1 does not vary much with the prior 
cooperation or deviation of the parties, whereas the desired q2 seems to decrease more 
substantially in response to deviations. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that 
parties revert to exchange based more on formal incentives and less on informal 
incentives in periods following deviation, because a formal-only contract is able to 
support a high q1, but a high q2 requires the use of informal incentives. In treatment L, 
both quality requests decrease after deviations. In treatment SX, there does not appear to 
be systematic difference in the requested quality based on the parties’ prior cooperation 
or deviation. 
Desired q1 has direct impact on payoffs when a formal bonus is used, so its value 
can be viewed as indicative of the true expectations of the parties. Desired q2, in contrast, 
may be viewed more as cheap talk by the buyer, because its value does not create any 
binding commitments for either party. Thus, that variable may not reflect the true 
expectations of the parties, and this may be especially true in periods following one or 
both parties’ deviation. 
Interestingly, use of the formal incentive in offers is highest in periods following 
the buyer’s deviation and the seller’s cooperation. This result could be interpreted as an 
attempt by the buyer to protect himself from retribution. Similarly, the unconditional 
price is also lowest in those periods, reducing the scope for reciprocation by the seller. 
Table 16 (at end of paper) presents an econometric investigation of the how the 
terms of offers vary with prior shirking by the seller or reneging on discretionary 
payments by the buyer. Column (A) shows the results of a logit estimation for the 
probability that the offer includes a formal incentive. Columns (B) and (C) present 
censored regression (Tobit) estimations for the desired q1 and q2, respectively. For all 
three models, the regressors included dummy variables for treatment effects (with S 
dropped, so it serves as the baseline), dummy variables for prior shirking and reneging 
behavior that were interacted with the treatment effects, and controls for the parties’ 
history (buyer’s prior-period earnings and current duration) and learning effects (linear 
and quadratic terms for the period). 
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The results of these estimations support the general patterns discussed for Table 
15. The requested q1 appears to vary little with prior shirking or reneging behavior, as 
indicated by the fact that few of the estimated coefficients for those effects were 
significant at standard levels. Desired q2 does show more correlation with the prior 
behavior of the parties, although the effect seems to stem primarily from the buyer’s 
deviations, rather than the seller’s. The use of the formal incentive varies greatly with the 
treatment, with higher use in S and L and less in SX and LX. It is also varies with 
shirking by the seller, although in an unexpected way. In treatments S and L, seller 
shirking decreases the use of the formal incentive. This might be explained as an attempt 
by the buyer to make payments less binding, allocating more of the total payment into the 
discretionary bonus, so that he can more harshly punish deviating sellers. However, this 
reaction was less in treatments SX and LX. Wald tests for the total effect of shirking in 
SX and LX (baseline S plus the difference for SX or LX) did not reject the null 
hypotheses that the shirking did not affect the use of formal incentives (p = 0.606 for SX 
and p = 0.347 for LX). As noted for Table 19, the use of the formal incentive also 
increases with reneging by the buyer, possibly to shift more to formal incentives since his 
unreliability with the discretionary bonus weakens the use of informal incentives. 
Table 17 compares the outcomes of exchange by the parties in periods following 
cooperation and deviation. Again, there were relatively few periods in which the seller 
shirked and the buyer did not withhold the discretionary bonus, so the means for those 
partitions should be viewed with caution. Comparing the other three partitions within 
each treatment reveals patterns similar to those from the comparison of offers after 
deviation. The actual quality levels achieved after deviation were generally less than 
those after cooperation, with a greater difference in q2 than in q1. This supports the idea 
that the parties tend to move closer to a formal-incentive-only exchange after deviation, 
relying less on informal incentives. The theoretical model predicts this behavior for 
treatments S and L, in which the formal-incentive-only contract is feasible in the stage 
game, but the predictions that parties revert to no exchange in treatments SX and LX do 
not hold up. Instead, it seems that the parties in all treatments reduce their reliance on 
informal incentives, but do not abandon them altogether, following deviations. 
Table 18  presents the results on econometric analyses of the outcomes of 
exchange following deviation by one or both parties. Columns (A) and (B) show the 
results of a censored regression (Tobit) for the determinants of q1 and q2, respectively. 
Column (C) presents a regression model for the buyer’s share of the net surplus. For all 
three models, the regressors included treatment effects (with S dropped, so it serves as the 
baseline), variables for prior shirking and reneging that were interacted with the 
treatments, and controls for the parties’ history (buyer and seller earnings in the previous 
period and the current duration of the partnership) and learning effects (linear and 
quadratic terms for the period). 
These results support the general patterns observed in Table 17 and provide some 
additional detail. Both q1 and q2 are reduced following shirking by sellers, although these 
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effects are more pronounced for treatments S and L than for SX and LX. In fact, Wald 
tests did not reject the null hypotheses that the total effects of shirking on q1 and q2 were 
0 for treatments SX and LX. (For q1, p = 0.234 in SX and p = 0.303 in LX. For q2, p = 
0.510 in SX and p = 0.950 in LX.) Buyers’ reneging behavior does not seem to influence 
the q1 achieved in the next periods, although it decreased the q2 achieved. 
As mentioned earlier, another possible form of punishment is for the parties to 
continue exchange under a relational contract but redistribute the net surplus away from 
the deviating party. The buyer share reported in Table 17 shows how the surplus is 
distributed among the parties in periods following the various combinations of 
cooperation and deviation. In general, the results do not support the hypothesis of 
punishment via redistribution. That hypothesis would predict that the buyer’s share would 
be less when only the buyer deviates than when both parties cooperate. However, the 
buyer’s share is roughly the same in these two cases under treatments L and S, and it is 
actually greater following the buyer’s deviation under treatment LX. In treatment SX, the 
buyer’s earnings decline dramatically (negative on average), but the average net surplus 
is negative, so a share calculation does not hold much meaning. 
The redistribution hypothesis predicts that the buyer’s share would increase 
following the seller’s deviation, perhaps to a lesser extent if the buyer has already enacted 
some punishment via withholding the discretionary bonus in the prior period. This 
prediction holds for treatment S, with the buyer’s share increasing substantially after the 
seller’s deviation, regardless of whether the buyer withheld the discretionary bonus. 
However, the results are mixed at best in the other treatments. In Table 22 (C), none of 
the coefficient estimates are significant at standard levels, indicating that the buyer’s 
share of the net surplus does not seem to correlate in an obvious way with the shirking 
and reneging behavior of the parties. 
The difference between subjects’ observed behavior and the assumption of the 
theoretical model regarding punishment strategies provides one possible avenue for 
explaining why some of the model’s predictions for outcomes did not hold. The 
substitution hypothesis in particular relies heavily on assumptions about the stage-game 
equilibria as the expected punishments for deviations from the relational contract. 
However, neither buyers nor sellers appear to use termination of the relationship as a 
punishment mechanism. 
One possible explanation for this apparent lack of a termination threat is that 
subjects are unwilling to “miss out” on the possibility to earn rewards themselves in order 
to punish their errant partners. In contrast, they do seem willing to use mechanisms such 
as buyers’ withholding of discretionary bonuses to apply punishment. The latter 
mechanism does not cost the punisher anything; in fact, it increases the buyer’s current-
period payoff. There is also some evidence that parties rely more heavily on formal 
incentives and less on informal incentives in periods following deviating behavior. 
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Conclusions 
The observed behavior corroborates a number of hypotheses about parties’ 
behavior in repeated interactions, while also presenting several results that contrast with 
theoretical predictions and assumptions. As expected, longer expected durations of 
partnerships improved the parties’ abilities to use informal incentives to achieve high-
quality outcomes. This effect is more apparent in situations in which the parties must rely 
heavily on informal incentives, such as when formal incentives are less available due to 
high transactions costs. 
The parties tend to select the contract structures that allow for higher gains from 
exchange. In particular, parties in the high-cost treatments chose to use contracts without 
formal incentives in 60% of exchanges, when formal incentives create a drag on net 
surplus by incurring an additional cost as well as possibly interfering with the operation 
of informal incentives. This result about endogenous choice among contracts provides 
support for the strategic ambiguity theory of Bernheim and Whinston (1998), 
complementing evidence from prior experimental studies (e.g. Wu and Roe, 2007b) that 
less complete contracts may be efficiency-enhancing in some environments. 
The observations also present some unusual results regarding the 
complementarity and substitution effects hypothesized by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 
(1994) and others. The complementarity effect was supported by the observations in the 
treatments in which the theoretical model predicted its existence. However, the effect did 
appear to be sensitive to whether the parties were able to coordinate in the initial stages of 
their relationship. 
By contrast, in the treatments for which the substitution effect was favored, the 
results showed the opposite of the predicted effect. This surprising outcome suggests that 
there may be behavioral effects that lead to important differences between the ways that 
informal incentives actually operate and the ways that theoretical models predict they will 
operate. In particular, subjects appear unlikely to use some of the punishment 
mechanisms that are available and that theory predicts they will use. The experimental 
subjects were generally willing to use withholding of discretionary payments as a means 
to punish shirking. They also appeared to rely more on formal incentives and less on 
informal incentives following deviations. However, they appeared unwilling to use 
termination of the relationship as a punish mechanism, nor did they reallocate the net 
surplus in subsequent periods away from the deviating party. The types of punishment 
did not vary with treatments in the ways that the theory assumed, suggesting that 
predictions relying on punishment differing across situations may not be robust. This 
non-differentiation is punishment may account to some degree for the failure of the 
substitution hypothesis. 
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 Means Kruskal-Wallis (p-values) 
 S SX L LX SX vs LX S vs L L vs LX S vs SX 
UseF 0.91 0.40 0.95 0.40 0.928 0.096 < 0.001 < 0.001 
DesiredQ1 9.07 8.35 9.00 9.18 < 0.001 0.092 0.019 < 0.001 
DesiredQ2 6.54 6.37 5.09 7.56 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 0.36611 
Q1 8.58 6.35 8.41 7.97 < 0.001 0.096 0.870 < 0.001 
Q2 4.57 3.79 3.46 5.18 0.002 0.023 < 0.001 0.265 
BEarn 24.75 3.36 16.39 12.56 0.008 < 0.001 0.372 < 0.001 
SEarn 27.29 21.95 32.55 23.82 0.942 0.036 < 0.001 0.017 
NetSurplus 32.04 5.32 28.94 16.38 < 0.001 0.007 < 0.001 < 0.001 
 
Table 10: Hypothesis Tests for Treatment Effects 
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 S SX L LX 
 Early Later p-value Early Later p-value Early Later p-value Early Later p-value 
UseF 0.86 0.96 0.006 0.40 0.40 0.941 0.92 0.97 0.087 0.43 0.37 0.408 
DesiredQ1 8.64 9.50 < 0.001 8.24 8.52 0.380 8.54 9.30 < 0.001 8.66 9.48 < 0.001 
DesiredQ2 6.91 6.15 0.188 6.28 6.52 0.495 5.48 4.83 0.067 7.05 7.86 0.019 
Q1 8.20 8.97 0.003 5.99 6.96 0.095 7.93 8.71 < 0.001 7.27 8.38 < 0.001 
Q2 5.04 4.08 0.028 3.60 4.13 0.386 3.00 3.75 0.077 4.28 5.70 0.012 
BEarn 25.29 24.20 0.480 0.35 8.50 0.393 8.86 21.21 < 0.001 10.05 14.02 0.567 
SEarn 25.78 28.83 0.948 22.70 20.69 0.337 36.79 29.84 0.045 19.73 26.22 0.008 
Net Surplus 31.07 33.03 0.871 3.05 9.19 0.368 25.65 31.05 < 0.001 9.78 20.25 0.011 
 
Table 11: Hypothesis Tests for Learning Trends 
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 Means Kruskal-Wallis (p-values) 
 S SX L LX SX vs LX S vs L L vs LX S vs SX 
UseF 0.93 0.43 0.99 0.43 0.987 0.045 < 0.001 < 0.001 
DesiredQ1 9.67 7.98 9.62 9.27 < 0.001 0.260 0.513 < 0.001 
DesiredQ2 8.15 6.28 5.87 7.82 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
Q1 9.43 6.64 9.49 8.32 0.001 0.348 0.004 < 0.001 
Q2 7.63 4.48 5.40 5.51 0.095 0.001 0.985 < 0.001 
BEarn 32.61 8.95 28.76 9.07 0.965 0.011 < 0.001 < 0.001 
SEarn 29.81 18.12 29.52 28.45 0.106 0.035 0.087 < 0.001 
NetSurplus 42.42 7.07 38.28 17.51 0.045 0.004 < 0.001 < 0.001 
 
Table 12: Initial Cooperation 
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Regressor Coefficent (Std Err) 
Price 0.044*** 
 (0.008) 
Formal Bonus 0.021*** 
 (0.006) 
Discretionary Bonus (Offered) 0.006* 
 (0.004) 
Requested q1 0.100* 
 (0.055) 
Requested q2 -0.136*** 
 (0.051) 
SX -1.341*** 
 (0.486) 
L -0.845* 
 (0.512) 
LX -0.008 
 (0.895) 
Buyer Deviate -0.375 
 (0.437) 
Buyer Deviate*SX 0.201 
 (0.685) 
Buyer Deviate*L 0.295 
 (0.512) 
Buyer Deviate*LX -0.381 
 (0.923) 
Seller’s Previous Earnings 0.038* 
 (0.021) 
  
N = 783  
Log pseudo likelihood = -393.19  
Pseudo R2 = 0.259  
 
Table 13: Probability of Seller’s Acceptance 
 
Asterisks indicate the significance level of the estimate: * at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 
level, and *** at the 1% level. The estimation procedure was a logit, and the standard 
errors reported are robust and adjusted for clustering on buyer-seller pairs. Additional 
control variables included but not reported are the current length of the partnership and 
linear and quadratic terms for the period. (None were significant at the 10% level.)
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Regressor Coefficient (StdErr) 
V(Q) -0.040*** 
 (0.012) 
Price 0.034** 
 (0.014) 
Formal Bonus 0.048*** 
 (0.015) 
Contract Fee (If formal) 0.012 
 (0.021) 
Discretionary Bonus (Offered) 0.051*** 
 (0.012) 
SX 0.789 
 (0.666) 
L 0.135 
 (0.487) 
LX -0.360 
 (0.650) 
Shirk 0.753* 
 (0.413) 
Buyer’s Previous Earnings -0.002 
 (0.008) 
  
N = 653  
Log pseudo likelihood = -296.13  
Pseudo R2 = 0.310  
 
Table 14: Probability of Buyer’s Withholding Discretionary Bonus 
 
Asterisks indicate the significance level of the estimate: * at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 
level, and *** at the 1% level. The estimation procedure was a logit, and the standard 
errors reported are robust and adjusted for clustering on buyer-seller pairs. Additional 
control variables included but not reported are the current length of the partnership and 
linear and quadratic terms for the period. (None were significant at the 10% level.)
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      Terms of Offers 
 Previous Period n 
Desired 
q1 
Desired 
q2 Formal Price 
Formal 
Bonus 
Discretionary 
Bonus 
S Cooperation 64 8.83 7.52 92.2% 26.61 63.75 38.34 
S Only buyer deviates 90 8.54 4.88 97.8% 29.40 54.49 43.81 
S Seller shirks, no withholding 12 7.58 4.25 58.3% 33.25 37.92 11.67 
S Seller shirks and buyer withholds 69 8.72 6.01 89.9% 29.62 46.59 52.57 
SX Cooperation 47 7.72 6.51 40.4% 48.34 14.40 32.98 
SX Only buyer deviates 100 7.90 7.18 50.0% 27.19 34.41 62.62 
SX Seller shirks, no withholding 6 9.00 7.50 50.0% 21.83 28.33 82.50 
SX Seller shirks and buyer withholds 53 7.75 6.09 43.4% 48.40 22.00 40.09 
L Cooperation 101 9.24 5.33 97.0% 44.21 56.12 15.67 
L Only buyer deviates 142 8.73 4.63 97.9% 38.82 50.92 24.54 
L Seller shirks, no withholding 20 7.80 3.95 80.0% 35.50 33.65 13.35 
L Seller shirks and buyer withholds 73 7.96 4.21 90.4% 43.55 31.36 31.49 
LX Cooperation 72 8.99 8.10 18.1% 59.10 12.11 65.75 
LX Only buyer deviates 167 8.31 6.32 48.5% 24.41 30.40 73.54 
LX Seller shirks, no withholding 14 8.71 8.00 21.4% 62.79 20.00 43.57 
LX Seller shirks and buyer withholds 78 8.83 6.54 41.0% 35.99 23.91 81.06 
 
Table 15: Post-Deviation Offers 
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(A) (B) (C) 
Dep. Var. Formal Desired q1 Desired q2 
Model Logit Tobit Tobit 
Regressor Coefficient (Std Err) Coefficient (Std Err) Coefficient (Std Err) 
SX -2.82*** -1.62 0.15 
 
(0.629) (0.998) (0.789) 
L 0.81 0.39 -1.49*** 
 
(0.696) (0.886) (0.953) 
LX -4.04*** 0.49 1.28*** 
 
(0.695) (0.984) (0.896) 
Seller shirks -1.89*** -0.53 0.23 
 
(0.607) (0.792) (0.661) 
Seller shirks 1.71** 1.03 -0.72 
(SX) (0.705) (1.144) (0.792) 
Seller shirks 0.04 -0.48 -0.55 
(L) (0.744) (1.031) (0.798) 
Seller shirks 1.62** 2.16** 0.27 
(LX) (0.674) (1.059) (0.854) 
Buyer 1.65** -0.27 -1.50*** 
reneges (0.647) (0.826) (0.635) 
Buyer -1.42* 0.55 2.03*** 
reneges (SX) (0.747) (1.185) (0.827) 
Buyer -1.03 -0.50 1.13* 
reneges (L) (0.837) (1.049) (0.884) 
Buyer -0.31 -1.15 -0.02 
reneges (LX) (0.817) (1.117) (0.885) 
Buyer’s 0.00 0.05*** 0.02*** 
earnings (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
N 1108 1108 1108 
Log pseudo 
  likelihood -466.91 -1673.51 -2263.95 
Pseudo R2 0.324 0.039 0.032 
 
Table 16: Terms of Post-Deviation Offers 
 
Asterisks indicate the significance level of the estimate: * at the 10% level, ** at the 5% 
level, and *** at the 1% level. For the logit (A), the standard errors reported are robust 
and adjusted for clustering on buyer-seller pairs. 
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Previous Period n Exchange q1 q2 
Buyer’s 
Earnings 
Net 
Surplus Buyer Share % 
S Cooperation 69 71.0% 9.20 7.76 29.63 41.53 71.4% 
S Only buyer deviates 93 68.8% 8.39 3.39 21.27 28.73 74.0% 
S Seller shirks, no withholding 12 75.0% 7.44 2.89 21.00 23.00 91.3% 
S Seller shirks and buyer withholds 72 56.9% 8.59 3.63 28.61 30.20 94.7% 
SX Cooperation 52 38.5% 7.20 4.60 10.70 16.45 65.0% 
SX Only buyer deviates 113 27.4% 5.16 2.74 -3.35 -5.65 N/A 
SX Seller shirks, no withholding 7 28.6% 10.00 7.00 5.00 9.00 55.6% 
SX Seller shirks and buyer withholds 58 51.7% 6.27 3.77 -3.77 3.70 -101.8% 
L Cooperation 114 66.7% 8.72 4.76 22.07 33.14 66.6% 
L Only buyer deviates 151 62.9% 8.69 3.28 19.68 30.04 65.5% 
L Seller shirks, no withholding 22 63.6% 7.14 2.79 19.36 21.29 90.9% 
L Seller shirks and buyer withholds 76 57.9% 8.02 2.27 9.36 24.66 38.0% 
LX Cooperation 108 47.2% 9.20 8.53 27.59 38.24 72.2% 
LX Only buyer deviates 181 41.4% 7.23 3.65 3.32 2.91 114.2% 
LX Seller shirks, no withholding 14 50.0% 7.86 6.86 14.43 28.00 51.5% 
LX Seller shirks and buyer withholds 82 54.9% 7.58 3.87 10.80 13.18 82.0% 
 
Table 17: Post-Deviation Exchanges 
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(A) (B) (C) 
Dep. Var. q1 q2 Buyer Share 
Model Tobit Tobit Regression 
Regressor Coefficient (Std Err) Coefficient (Std Err) Coefficient (Std Err) 
SX -2.28 -1.39 -0.18 
 
(2.143) (1.715) (0.300) 
L -1.87 -3.85*** -0.20 
 
(1.643) (1.269) (0.226) 
LX -1.25 3.11** -0.38 
 
(1.923) (1.470) (0.342) 
Seller shirks -2.96* -4.68*** 0.19 
 
(1.516) (1.273) (0.165) 
Seller shirks 5.18** 5.80*** -0.07 
(SX) (2.394) (2.101) (0.693) 
Seller shirks -0.39 -0.40 0.14 
(L) (1.941) (1.714) (0.483) 
Seller shirks 4.39** 4.61*** -0.45 
(LX) (2.063) (1.733) (0.988) 
Buyer 0.91 -3.43*** -0.26 
reneges (1.579) (1.257) (0.243) 
Buyer -4.25 1.14 0.80 
reneges (SX) (2.586) (2.159) (0.896) 
Buyer 0.24 2.94* -0.17 
reneges (L) (1.935) (1.559) (0.240) 
Buyer -1.96 -1.13 0.35 
reneges (LX) (2.203) (1.750) (0.519) 
Buyer’s 0.17*** 0.18*** -0.00 
earnings (0.020) (0.017) (0.007) 
Seller’s 0.19*** 0.22*** -0.05** 
earnings (0.028) (0.024) (0.020) 
N 653 653 525 
Log pseudo 
  likelihood -918.33 -1087.49 
 Pseudo R2 0.228 0.384 
 R2 
  
0.134 
 
Table 18: Outcomes of Post-Deviation Exchanges 
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Notes for Table 18: Asterisks indicate the significance level of the estimate: * at the 10% 
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. For the regression (C), the standard 
errors reported are robust and adjusted for clustering on buyer-seller pairs. 
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SAMPLE INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 
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Session SX Instructions 
 
Welcome to today’s experiment! Thank you for participating and helping with our 
economics research. 
 
Payment and ID Numbers 
Your monetary compensation will depend on the decisions you make during the 
experiment. You start with a balance of 250 points. Based on your decisions and those of 
your trading partners, you can accumulate additional points, which will be converted into 
money at the rate of 50 points = $1. All money will be paid at the end of the experiment. 
 
For this experiment, you will be identified by the ID number we assigned to you when 
you checked in. You will remain anonymous in the data we collect, so that no one will 
know what decisions you made or how much money you earned. 
 
We do have a few ground rules for the experiment: 
 Please do not talk to other participants during the experiment. You will interact 
with others through the computer game that you will play, but any other 
communication is prohibited. 
 If you have any questions or problems during the experiment, please ask one of 
the researchers. 
 Please turn off all cell phones, pagers, etc. for the duration of the experiment. 
 
At this time, please enter your ID number in the appropriate field on your computer 
screen and click the OK button. 
 
Overview 
You (the participants) will be divided equally into two groups: half of you will be buyers 
and the other half will be sellers. Each of you will be randomly assigned to one of these 
roles and will remain in that role for the entire experiment. 
 
Buyers and sellers will be randomly matched into pairs, with one buyer and one seller 
per pair. Each buyer-seller pair will have the opportunity to make one or more 
transactions of hypothetical products. 
 
In each period, each buyer-seller pair can make one transaction involving two important 
characteristics: quantity and quality. The buyer earns points from a transaction, with the 
total number of points depending on the quantity and quality provided. Likewise, the 
52 
 
seller incurs a cost to carry out the transaction, also depending on the quantity and quality 
provided. In addition, the buyer makes payments to the seller. 
 
A buyer-seller pair will remain matched together for a random number of periods. In 
each period, the buyer can make an offer specifying the quantity and quality s/he wants 
and the payments s/he will make to the seller. 
 
Quantity and Quality 
Quantity 
The seller can provide any quantity from 1 to 10 (whole numbers only). A higher 
quantity provides more points to the buyer than a low quantity, but it also costs more for 
the seller to produce. 
 
Quality 
Similarly, the quality delivered by the seller can range from 1 to 10. A product with high 
quality is worth more to the buyer than one with low quality, but it also costs more for the 
seller to produce. 
 
Benefits and Costs 
The points a buyer earns (i.e. buyer’s revenue) from a transaction is expressed by the 
equation: 
 
Buyer’s revenue = (10 × quantity) + (10 × quality) 
 
Similarly, the production cost for the seller (in points) in a transaction is given by: 
 
Seller’s cost = (5 × quantity) + (8 × quality) 
 
The table attached to these instructions lists the buyer’s revenue and the seller’s cost for 
each possible combination of quantity and quality. 
 
Offers 
To initiate a transaction, the buyer makes an offer to the seller, who may then accept or 
reject it. The terms of the offer determine how much the buyer will pay the seller for the 
transaction. There are several terms that the buyer can include in his offer: desired 
product (quantity and quality), formal payment terms (base price and formal bonus), 
and discretionary bonus. 
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Desired Product 
The buyer’s offer specifies the quantity and quality desired by the buyer. However, 
these terms are not binding. If the seller accepts the offer, s/he can choose to provide any 
quantity and quality, not necessarily those specified in the offer. 
Formal Payment Terms 
In the offer, the buyer can specify two formal payment terms. The base price is an 
amount that the buyer will pay regardless of the quantity or quality provided. The base 
price may range from 0 to 200 points. 
 
The offer may also specify a formal bonus, an additional payment that the buyer must 
make if the seller provides at least the quantity specified in the offer. The formal bonus 
amount can range from 0 to 200 points. This term allows the buyer to make the seller’s 
compensation depend, at least partially, on what the seller provides. Using a formal bonus 
term incurs a contract fee of 35 points, which the buyer pays if the seller accepts the 
offer. (Note: The buyer avoids this contract fee if s/he chooses 0 for the formal bonus 
amount.) The formal bonus is similar to a real-world contract that ties part of the payment 
to achieving some measurable benchmark, such as completing a project on schedule. 
 
The two formal payment terms are binding, which means that they are like a formal 
written contract that will be legally enforced. The buyer must pay the specified base price 
if the seller accepts the offer, regardless of what quantity and quality are provided. The 
buyer must pay the specified formal bonus amount whenever the seller provides at least 
the quantity specified, regardless of the quality provided. 
 
The quantity of a transaction is relatively easy to measure, which is why a formal bonus 
based on quantity is binding (i.e. enforced by the computer). Quality, on the other hand, 
is subjective, so it is difficult to measure. For this reason, it is impossible to make a 
binding formal bonus that depends on quality. 
 
Discretionary Bonus 
In addition to the formal payment terms, the buyer can offer a discretionary bonus. In 
the offer, the buyer specifies an amount ranging from 0 to 200 points for this bonus. The 
buyer pays no cost for specifying a discretionary bonus. 
 
The discretionary bonus term is not binding, which means that it is like a “handshake 
agreement” that cannot be legally enforced. Regardless of the amount specified in the 
offer, the buyer can choose any amount from 0 to 200 points for the discretionary bonus 
once s/he sees the quantity and quality delivered by the seller. 
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Earnings 
The numbers of points that the buyer and seller earn in a period depend on the buyer’s 
revenue, the seller’s production cost, the formal payment terms specified in the contract 
(base price and/or formal bonus), and the discretionary bonus chosen by the buyer. 
 
If no offer is made or the offer is rejected: 
 The buyer earns 0 points. 
 The seller earns 20 points. 
 
If an offer with a formal bonus (i.e. greater than 0) is accepted and the quantity provided 
is equal to or greater than the quantity specified in the offer: 
 Buyer’s earnings = (revenue) – (base price) – (formal bonus)  
– (discretionary bonus) – (contract fee) 
 Seller’s earnings = (base price) + (formal bonus) + (discretionary bonus)  
– (production cost) 
 
If an offer with a formal bonus (i.e. greater than 0) is accepted and the quantity provided 
is less than the quantity specified in the offer: 
 Buyer’s earnings = (revenue) – (base price) – (discretionary bonus)  
– (contract fee) 
 Seller’s earnings = (base price) + (discretionary bonus)  
– (production cost) 
 
If an offer with no formal bonus (i.e. equal to 0) is accepted: 
 Buyer’s earnings = (revenue) – (base price) – (discretionary bonus) 
 Seller’s earnings = (base price) + (discretionary bonus) – (production cost) 
 
It is possible for buyers and/or sellers to lose points (i.e. have negative earnings) in a 
period. If this occurs, the points will be subtracted from that person’s point balance. 
 
Sequence of Choices 
In each period, the buyer’s and seller’s choices follow a particular sequence. 
1. Buyer makes an offer. 
2. Seller accepts or rejects the offer, 
3. If accepted, the seller chooses quantity and quality. 
4. Buyer chooses discretionary bonus. 
 
Next, we’ll look at the details of each step. 
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1. Buyer Makes Offer 
The buyer chooses whether to make an offer for the period. If the buyer chooses to make 
an offer, s/he must specify the desired product (quantity and quality), the formal payment 
terms (base price and formal bonus), and the discretionary bonus. 
 
 The buyer must fill in the Quantity and Quality fields with numbers from 1 to 10. 
These desired amounts are not binding on the seller, who can choose to provide 
any quantity and quality s/he desires (later, in step 3). 
 The buyer must fill in the Base Price field with a number from 0 to 200. The base 
price is binding on the buyer. 
 The buyer can fill in the Formal Bonus field with a number from 0 to 200. 
Remember that specifying a number greater than 0 means that the buyer will pay 
a contract fee of 35 points if the seller accepts the offer. 
o The formal bonus is binding on the buyer, which means that if the seller 
provides at least the quantity specified in the offer, the buyer must pay the 
formal bonus. If the seller provides a lower quantity than that specified in the 
offer, then the formal bonus is not paid. 
o You can think of the contract fee for offering a formal bonus as the legal costs 
of writing and enforcing a formal contract (e.g. lawyers and court fees). 
 The buyer must fill in the Discretionary Bonus field with a number from 0 to 200. 
The discretionary bonus is not binding on the buyer, who can choose any amount 
once s/he sees the quantity and quality provided by the seller. 
 Each buyer has 120 seconds to make an offer. If s/he does not make an offer 
within this limit, then the default is No Offer for that period. 
 
All numbers must be whole numbers. 
 
Once the buyer specifies the terms of the offer, s/he clicks the Offer button to submit the 
offer to the seller. 
 
If the buyer chooses not to make an offer, then the buyer receives 0 points and the seller 
receives 20 points for that period. To choose not to make an offer, the buyer clicks the No 
Offer button. 
 
2. Seller Accepts or Rejects 
When the buyer makes an offer, the seller will see the details of the offer and then choose 
whether to accept it or reject it. If the buyer did not make an offer, then the seller does not 
make any decision for that period. 
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If the seller accepts the offer, the points earned by the buyer and seller depend on the 
terms of the offer and the quantity and quality that the seller chooses in the next step. To 
accept the offer, the seller clicks the Accept button. 
• Each seller has 90 seconds to choose between accepting and rejecting the offer. If 
s/he does not choose within this limit, then the default is Reject for that period. 
 
If the seller rejects the offer, then the buyer receives 0 points and the seller receives 20 
points for that period. To reject the offer, the seller clicks the Reject button. 
 
3. Seller Chooses Quantity and Quality 
If the seller accepts the offer, s/he next must fill in the Quantity and Quality fields (each 
ranges from 1 to 10) and then click the Continue button. The combination of quantity and 
quality affects her production costs, as described earlier. 
 
4. Buyer Chooses Discretionary Bonus 
If the buyer makes an offer and the seller accepts it, then the buyer will have the 
opportunity to choose a discretionary bonus to pay to the seller once s/he sees the 
quantity and quality provided. 
 
The buyer must enter the amount in the Discretionary Bonus field (a number from 0 to 
200) and then click the Continue button. Note that the buyer can choose a discretionary 
bonus that is different from that specified in the offer. 
 
Summary Screen 
After all decisions are made for a period, both the buyer and the seller will see summary 
screens displaying the following information about their transaction for that period: 
 
Terms specified in the offer: 
 Desired quantity 
 Desired quality 
 Base price 
 Formal bonus 
 Discretionary bonus 
 
Seller’s choices: 
 Accept or reject the offer 
 Quantity provided 
 Quality provided 
 
57 
 
Payment details: 
 Buyer’s revenue 
 Seller’s production cost 
 Formal bonus paid 
 Discretionary bonus paid 
 Contract fee (if formal bonus is used) 
 Buyer’s earnings 
 Seller’s earnings 
 
You can use the attached worksheet to track your transactions over time and with 
different partners. Once you have finished looking at the summary screen, please click 
the Continue button. 
 
Changing Partners 
At the end of each period, the computer will randomly determine whether the current 
buyer-seller pair will remain matched together. There is a two-thirds (approx. 67%) 
probability that the buyer and seller will remain matched together for another period. 
 
You can think of this probability as though the computer randomly draws a number from 
1 to 100. If the number drawn is in the 1-67 range, then buyers and sellers remain with 
their current partners for another period. If the number drawn is in the 68-100 range, then 
that pairing ends, and either the participants will be randomly matched with new partners 
or the experiment will end. 
 
Thus, the number of times you will interact with each partner is random, but the average 
duration is approximately 3 periods. Once 10 periods have been played, the next pairing 
will be the last one for the experiment. When the random draw ends that final pairing, the 
experiment as a whole will end. The researchers will announce when the final pairing 
begins. 
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Example Questions and Trial Periods 
To make sure that you understand the experiment, we will conduct two additional 
activities before you start earning points. First, you will answer a short series of multiple-
choice questions that test your understanding of the rules and structure. Please feel free to 
refer to these instructions or to ask questions of the researchers. 
 
Second, we will play 3 trial periods of the game. These trial periods are exactly like the 
regular experiment, with two exceptions: 
 
 Your decisions in the trial periods do not affect how much money you will earn, 
and 
 You will be matched with your partner for exactly 3 periods, rather than a random 
number of periods. 
 
After the trial periods end, you will be matched with a new partner to begin the scored 
periods. Now is a good time for you ask any questions you may have about the 
experiment, before we begin the example questions and trial periods. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
DERIVATIONS OF RESULTS THEORETICAL MODEL 
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This section shows the calculations and assumptions used to derive the various 
conditions discussed for each of the contracts discussed in the theoretical model. 
B.1 Seller’s Participation Constraints 
Since the seller has an outside option that pays μ per period, he will enter the 
relational contract only if his expected payoff under that contract is at least as great as μ 
per period. The contract covers multiple periods with a probabilistic termination, which is 
mathematically equivalent to an infinite time horizon with discounting. 
Under the conditional contract, the seller receives a fixed price, p, a formal bonus, 
f, and a discretionary bonus, d, and pays the production cost, C(Q), in each period. 
Following Levin (2003), we analyze stationary contracts only, since any optimal contract 
has an equivalent stationary contract under the assumptions of this model. The 
requirement that the seller’s expected payoff under the contract exceed her reservation 
payoff can be written as: 
( )[ ] µδδ ∑∑
∞
=
∞
=
≥−++
00 t
t
t
t QCdfp  
 
Factoring out the stationary payment terms on each side of the inequality yields: 
( )[ ] ∑∑
∞
=
∞
=
≥−++
00 t
t
t
tQCdfp δµδ  
 
Replacing the sum of the geometric series, ∑
∞
=0t
tδ , with its limit, dividing by that 
limit, and then rearranging terms leads to the expression given in (C1): 
p + f + d ≥ C(Q) + μ 
 
With regard to (U1), note that in the unconditional contract, the seller faces the 
same payoff structure except that f is constrained to be zero. 
B.2 Seller’s Incentive-Compatibility Constraints 
The seller incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint incorporates the idea that a 
rational seller would deviate from the equilibrium behavior if and only if the net payoff 
from such a deviation (accounting for credible punishments by the buyer) is larger than 
her payoff in equilibrium. 
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The following derivations assume that the buyer will use a “grim trigger” 
strategy, in which any deviation by the seller results in the buyer abandoning offers 
relying on relational incentives and instead making the optimal (for the buyer) stage-
game offer in each period. In the stage game, the optimizing buyer will always reduce the 
payments to the seller until the seller’s payoffs are equal to μ, his reservation payoff. 
Also, when no-exchange is the stage equilibrium outcome, the seller’s payoff is still μ. 
Thus, regardless of the parameterization, the threat of the grim trigger strategy is always 
to reduce the seller’s future payoffs to μ. 
In equilibrium under an unconditional contract, the seller’s payoff is p + d – C(Q). 
The left-hand side (LHS) of the condition below reflects the expected value of receiving 
that payoff indefinitely into the future, as would occur in equilibrium. If the seller 
chooses to deviate, his best option is to produce the minimum quality in the current 
period, yielding a payoff of p – Cmin, since producing other quality levels would reduce 
his current payoff without changing his payoffs for future periods. Also, the buyer is 
forced to pay the fixed price, p, but would withhold the discretionary bonus in the event 
of the seller’s deviation and terminate the relationship for all future periods. As noted 
above, the seller’s payoffs for all future periods will be μ. The right-hand side (RHS) of 
the condition below is the sum of the current payoff and the discounted payoffs from 
future periods. 
( )[ ] µδδ ∑∑
∞
=
∞
=
+−≥−+
1
min
0 t
t
t
t CpQCdp  
 
Substituting the limit of the sum for geometric series leads to the following 
expression: 
( )[ ] µ
δ
δ
δ −
+−≥−+
− 11
1
minCpQCdp  
 
Multiplying both sides by (1 – δ), dividing by δ, and rearranging terms leads to 
the condition as expressed in (U2): 
( )
µ
δ
δ
δδ
+
−
−≥+ min
1 CQCdp  
 
In equilibrium under a conditional contract, the seller’s payoff is p + f + d – C(Q). 
The left-hand side (LHS) of the condition below reflects the expected value of receiving 
that payoff indefinitely into the future, as would occur in equilibrium. If the seller 
chooses to deviate, his best option is either to produce (q1, qmin) and receive both the price 
and the bonus or to produce the minimum quality Qmin and receive only the price. 
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Producing a q1 that is more than qmin but less than the requested level is inferior to 
producing qmin since it increases the seller’s production cost without increasing his 
payment. A rational buyer would ensure that the amount of f is incentive-compatible, so 
that the seller’s best deviation will be to produce (q1, qmin) and receive the formal bonus 
while incurring a cost of C(q1, qmin). The RHS of the condition below reflects the seller’s 
expected payoffs from deviation. 
( )[ ] ( ) µδδ ∑∑
∞
=
∞
=
+−≥−++
1
min1
0
,
t
t
t
t qqCpQCdfp  
 
Substituting the limits for the sums of the geometric series and using 
manipulations similar to those above leads to the expression for (C2): 
( ) ( ) µ
δ
δ
δδ
+
−
−≥++ min1 ,
1 qqCQCdfp  
 
B.3 Buyer’s Participation Constraints 
The buyer’s reservation payoff is assumed to be normalized to 0. A rational buyer 
would enter the relational contract only if the expected payoff under that offer is greater 
than 0 per period. In equilibrium, the buyer receives the good from the seller and pays 
under the contract terms, so therefore his anticipated benefits from the good less the 
payments must be greater than 0. 
Under an unconditional contract, the buyer pays the fixed price, p, and the 
discretionary bonus, d, in each period, while receiving the value of the good, V(Q). His 
expected payoff over the life of the contract forms the LHS of the expression below. His 
expected payoff if he does not enter a contract is zero, forming the RHS of the condition. 
( )[ ] 0
0
≥−−∑
∞
=t
t dpQVδ  
 
Substituting for the limit of the sum of the geometric series and rearranging terms 
yields the expression for (U3): 
p + d ≤ V(Q) 
 
In a conditional contract equilibrium, the buyer pays the fixed price, p, the formal 
bonus, f, and the discretionary bonus, d, while receiving the value of the good, V(Q), in 
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each period. He must also pay the transaction cost, x, for using the formal incentive. 
Thus, the expected value of his payoff under the contract is given by the LHS of the 
expression below. His expected payoff if he does not enter a contract is zero, forming the 
RHS of the condition. 
( )[ ] 0
0
≥−−−−∑
∞
=t
t xdfpQVδ  
 
Substituting for the limit of the sum of the geometric series and rearranging terms 
yields the expression for (C3): 
p + f + d ≤ V(Q) – x 
 
B.4 Buyer’s Incentive-Compatibility Constraints 
At the end of each period, the buyer must decide whether to pay the promised 
discretionary bonus or not. If he withholds the bonus payment, then he saves that expense 
in the current period but then the seller will punish him by reverting to the stage-game 
outcome for all periods in the future (the grim trigger strategy). A rational buyer would 
therefore deviate from the equilibrium behavior if and only if the net payoff from such a 
deviation (accounting for credible punishments by the buyer) is larger than his payoff in 
equilibrium. 
The buyer’s payoff under the stage game is represented by Πstage, as defined in the 
body of the paper. The amount depends on which of the three types of stage-game 
outcomes is the equilibrium, which in turn depends on the functional forms and 
parameter values of the problem. 
Under an unconditional contract, a buyer choosing to pay the discretionary bonus 
receives his equilibrium payoff, V(Q) – p – d, in each period into the future, so that his 
expected payoff is represented by the LHS of the condition below. If he chooses to 
deviate, then he increases his current payoff by the amount of the withheld bonus, but 
then he will receive his stage-game payoff for all subsequent periods. The expected value 
of this series of payoffs is given by the RHS of the condition below. 
( )[ ] ( ) ∑∑
∞
=
∞
=
Π+−≥−−
1
stage
0 t
t
t
t pQVdpQV δδ  
 
Substituting the limits for the sums of the geometric sequences yields: 
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( )[ ] ( ) stage11
1
Π
−
+−≥−−
− δ
δ
δ
pQVdpQV  
 
Rearranging terms leads to the expression for (U4): 
( ) stageΠ−≤+ QV
dp
δ
 
 
Under a conditional contract, the buyer receives the payoff of V(Q) – p – f – d – x 
each period in equilibrium. The expected value is given by the LHS of the condition 
below. If he deviates by withholding the discretionary bonus, then he increases his 
current payoff by d but receives only the stage-game payoff for all subsequent periods, as 
shown in the RHS of the condition. 
( )[ ] ( ) ∑∑
∞
=
∞
=
Π+−−−≥−−−−
1
stage
0 t
t
t
t xfpQVxdfpQV δδ  
 
Substituting for the limits of the sums of the infinite series and rearranging terms 
leads to the expression for (C4): 
( ) xQVdfp −Π−≤++ stageδ
 
 
B.5 Feasibility Conditions 
The four participation and incentive-compatibility constraints for each contract 
type can be combined to determine whether an equilibrium under that contract type is 
feasible for the parameters of the model and a given quality request (Q). In general, some 
of the constraints may be redundant, meaning that meeting one constraint automatically 
implies that the other is met. When possible, we remove the “looser” constraints from the 
analysis. 
First, consider the unconditional contract and its four equilibrium constraints. 
Compare the buyer’s constraints, (U3) and (U4), which can be rewritten as (U3’) and 
(U4’), respectively: 
 V(Q) – p – d ≥ 0 (U3’) 
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 ( ) 0stage ≥Π−−− δ
dpQV  (U4’) 
 
Since the RHS are equal, the condition with the lesser LHS will be the binding 
constraint. Compare the two LHS of (U3’) and (U4’), with <??> representing an 
unknown inequality operator. 
( ) ( ) stage?? Π−−−><−− δ
dpQVdpQV  
 
Combining similar terms yields the following: 
0??1stage ><
−
+Π d
δ
δ  
 
Given that δ > 0, Πstage ≥ 0 and d ≥ 0, the LHS must be greater than or equal to 
zero, implying that (U4) binds and (U3) does not. 
Next, compare the seller’s constraints, (U1) and (U2), by rewriting them as the 
following (U1’) and (U2’), respectively: 
 p + d – C(Q) – μ ≥ 0 (U1’) 
 ( ) 01 min ≥−
−
+−+ µ
δ
δ
δδ
CQCdp  (U2’) 
 
Since the RHS are equal, the condition with the lesser LHS will be the binding 
constraint. Compare the two LHS of (U1’) and (U2’), with <??> representing an 
unknown inequality operator. 
( ) ( ) µ
δ
δ
δδ
µ −−+−+><−−+ min
1?? CQCdpQCdp  
 
Combining similar terms yields the following: 
( )[ ] 0??1 min ><−−
− dCQC
δ
δ  
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The LHS will equal zero for ( ) minˆ CQCdd U −== . Substituting Udˆ back into 
either condition and requiring equality yields a µ+= minˆ Cp
U .Thus, for any given Q 
there is a contract ( )Qdp UU ,ˆ,ˆ  for which the (U1) and (U2) constraints are equivalent. 
That is, the contract will either meet both conditions or neither. 
Consider the case when both (U2) and (U4) hold. This implies that the following 
double inequality is true: 
( ) ( ) µ
δ
δ
δδ
+
−
−≥+≥Π− minstage
1 CQCdpQV  
 
In this case, any (p, d) that makes (U2) hold with equality will also meet the (U4) 
condition. Since ( )UU dp ˆ,ˆ  is one such pair, then (U1) can also be met in this case. Thus, 
if (U2) and (U4) can both be met, then (U1) can also be met, meaning that we can reduce 
the feasibility analysis to considering whether (U2) and (U4) can both be met. This 
simplification allows the expression of the feasibility condition for an unconditional 
contract as (U5): 
( ) ( ) µ
δ
δ
δ
+
−
−Π≥− minstage
1 CQCQV  
 
When (U5) is true for a given Q, there is at least one (p, d) contract that supports 
an equilibrium that both parties find preferable to no-exchange and in which neither party 
will deviate, for fear of punishment. 
Next, consider the conditional contract and its equilibrium constraints. The 
buyer’s constraints, (C3) and (C4), which can be rewritten as (C3’) and (C4’), 
respectively: 
 V(Q) – p – f – d – x ≥ 0 (C3’) 
 ( ) 0stage ≥Π−−−−− x
dfpQV
δ
 (C4’) 
 
Since the RHS are equal, the condition with the lesser LHS will be the binding 
constraint. Compare the two LHS with <??> representing an unknown inequality 
operator. 
( ) ( ) stage?? Π−−−−−><−−−− x
dfpQVxdfpQV
δ
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Combining similar terms yields the following: 
0??1stage ><
−
+Π d
δ
δ  
 
Given that δ > 0, Πstage ≥ 0 and d ≥ 0, the LHS must be greater than or equal to 
zero, implying that (C4) binds and (C3) does not. 
Next, compare the seller’s constraints and rewrite them as (C1’) and (C2’): 
 p + f + d – C(Q) – μ ≥ 0 (C1’) 
 ( ) ( ) 0,1 min1 ≥−
−
+−++ µ
δ
δ
δδ
qqCQCdfp  (C2’) 
 
Since the RHS are equal, the condition with the lesser LHS will be the binding 
constraint. Compare the two LHS with <??> representing an unknown inequality 
operator. 
( ) ( ) ( ) µ
δ
δ
δδ
µ −−+−++><−−++ min1 ,
1?? qqCQCdfpQCdfp  
 
Combining similar terms yields the following: 
( ) ( )[ ] 0??,1 min1 ><−−
− dqqCQC
δ
δ  
 
The LHS will equal zero for ( ) ( )min1 ,ˆ qqCQCdd C −== . Substituting Cdˆ back 
into either condition and requiring equality yields possible pairs ( )CC fp ˆ,ˆ  such that 
( ) µ+=+ min1 ,ˆˆ qqCfp CC .Thus, for any given Q there is a contract ( )Qdfp CCC ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  for 
which the (C1) and (C2) constraints are equivalent. That is, the contract will either meet 
both conditions or neither. 
Consider the case when both (C2) and (C4) hold. This implies that the following 
double inequality is true: 
( ) ( ) ( ) µ
δ
δ
δδ
+
−
−≥++≥−Π− min1stage ,
1 qqCQCdfpxQV  
68 
 
 
In this case, any (p, d) that makes (C2) hold with equality will also meet the (C4) 
condition. Since ( )CC dp ˆ,ˆ  is one such pair, then (C1) can also be met in this case. Thus, if 
(C2) and (C4) can both be met, then (C1) can also be met, meaning that we can reduce 
the feasibility analysis to considering whether (C2) and (C4) can both be met. This 
simplification allows the expression of the feasibility condition for a conditional contract 
as (C5): 
( ) ( ) ( ) xqqCQCQV ++−−Π≥− µ
δ
δ
δ min1stage
,1  
 
When (C5) is true for a given Q, there is at least one (p, d) contract that supports 
an equilibrium that both parties find preferable to no-exchange and in which neither party 
will deviate, for fear of punishment. 
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